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ABSTRACT  
 
This project examines constitution-making in transition by analyzing both the 2012 
Egyptian and the 2014 Tunisian constitutions as case studies. The processes of the 
two constitutions took place in quite similar post-uprising contexts in which Islamists 
were the majority and yet resulted in different outcomes. The project aims to identify 
and analyze the variables that influenced constitution-making processes in both 
countries and hence the outcomes as indicated in the analysis of a selected number of 
civil and political rights in both constitutions. The project answers three questions: 
Why did Islamists in Egypt gain a qualified majority at the constituent assembly, 
while Ennahda Islamists in Tunisia gained only a simple majority? How did these 
majorities impact the constitution-making process in each country, and how did the 
process shape the constitutional outcome? The conceptual framework of the project 
sets a number of factors (independent variables) that were at stake during transition 
and influenced the constitution-making process (intermediate variable), which, in 
turn, shaped the outcome (dependent variable). The project concludes that the selected 
articles of civil and political rights in the Tunisian constitution come closer to the 
international norms of the ICCPR as an attempt at reaching a compromise with the 
vision of the non-Islamist groups, whereas the articles in the 2012 Egyptian 
constitution drifted from the ICCPR, and the vision/agenda of the Islamist majority 
was predominant in the constitutional text. The project presents conclusions and 
lessons learned that could provide directions for future research on constitution-
making.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT 
 
Background  
The wave of uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region by the end of 2010 raised the expectations of a new dawn that would pave the 
way towards democracy-building in the region. Accordingly, it has been referred to as 
the “Arab spring” that would eventually replace the authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world with a form of democratic and inclusive governance that reinforces people's 
sovereignty and protects human rights. The spring, however, has turned to a severe 
winter in some countries, such as Syria and Libya, where civil uprisings have become 
armed conflicts resulting in hundreds of thousands of fatalities and refugees. Even in 
countries that have managed to topple their authoritarian regimes in less violent ways, 
such as Tunisia and Egypt, the transition process in shaping a new regime faced 
myriad challenges. A central challenge was constitution-making, which would lead to 
the establishment of a new social contract that would formalize the future political 
arrangements of these countries, and fulfill the people’s aspirations for freedom, 
dignity, and equality. 
Egypt and Tunisia both embarked on transitions in quite similar contexts, 
characterized by the emergence of a plethora of new political and social actors, the 
rise of Islamists1 to power, Muslims brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda Islamists in 
Tunisia, and rising economic and security challenges, in addition to extreme 
                                                           
1 The word “Islamist” is used here to refer to those who view Islam as a comprehensive way of life for 
personal conduct, conduct of state, and society (Said & Funk, 2001). They call for the revival of the 
ideals of Islam as a means of confronting the westernization of Arab and Muslim-majority countries. 
They call for an Islamic state ruled in accordance with sharia, Islamic laws. And finally, they embrace 
the concept of ijtehad, reinterpretation, of the Quran and Islamic traditions to apply them to today’s 
world (Knudsen, 2003). 
2 
polarization between the Islamists and non-Islamist groups2. At the center of the 
transitional processes in both countries was constitution-making, for which both 
countries took divergent paths. In Egypt, immediately after the ouster of President 
Mubarak, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) adopted a constitutional 
declaration of 62 articles including articles approved by a referendum. The declaration 
was considered a provisional constitution that governed the transition phase, 
organizing the parliamentary elections and the establishment of a constituent 
assembly. The constituent assembly, which was predominantly Islamist, adopted a 
draft constitution in December 2012, and a referendum was held to determine its 
definitive adoption. This constitution was suspended in July 2013 after the removal of 
the Muslim Brotherhood's regime in Egypt, and then modified in 2014.  
Tunisia, on the other hand, began the constitution-making process with the 
election of a constituent assembly in October 2011 in which Ennahda Islamists gained 
a simple majority3. The members of the assembly voted to elect a provisional 
president and prime minister for the country. Although the constituent assembly was 
supposed to end its work within a year, the new constitution was not adopted by the 
constituent assembly until January 2014, after more than two years of disagreements, 
arguments, violence, assassinations, and finally, concession and compromises. The 
                                                           
2 The term non-Islamist groups is used here to refer loosely to all other political and social groups 
besides the Islamists, with their different ideological orientations. The term refers to those political 
parties that are united by their defense of the principles of separation of political and religious spaces 
and the protection of the rights of association, expression, and belief, equality and non-discrimination, 
and free elections (Awad, 2013).   
3 Three types of majority are referred to in this project: (1) Simple majority: is obtained when there is 
more valid votes in favor then against, while not constituting an absolute majority; (2) Absolute 
Majority (50 + 1 vote): is obtained when in favor votes represent more than 50% of all valid votes; and 
(3) Qualified majority or 2/3 majority: is obtained when in favor votes represent two-thirds of all valid 
votes (Juridical Commission, 2015; Dictionary of Politics and Government, 2004).   
3 
adoption of the new constitution was followed by parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2014.   
Problem Statement and Research Questions  
A central challenge for the transition of both the Tunisia and Egypt post-Arab 
uprising was constitution-making. The constitution-making processes in both 
countries took place in similar contexts and had the same risk of being abused by the 
unilateral exercise of power of the Islamist-majority at both constituent assemblies to 
either impose their own agendas on the constitution or consolidate power. Another 
challenge for the process was the conflict and extreme polarization between Islamist 
and not-Islamist actors over the outlook of the new regime, including the question of 
the status of religion in the new constitution; its role in the state's affairs, the shape of 
the new political system, and rights and freedoms, particularly civil, political, and 
women's rights. The two constitution-making processes resulted in different 
outcomes: Tunisia managed to overcome a breakdown of the process, proudly 
producing a progressive, rights-maintaining and compromise constitution, whereas in 
Egyptian case, the vision/agenda of the Islamist majority was predominant in the 
constitutional text. 
This master's project analyzes both the 2012 Egyptian and the 2014 Tunisian 
constitution-making processes within a conceptual framework based on the recently 
developed constitution-making literature, which lacks a theory of constitution-
making, yet presents a number of propositions about the challenges and the risks 
involved in the constitution-making process. The project aims within this framework 
to identify and analyze the variables that had influenced both constitution-making 
processes that led to different outcomes.  
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In order to examine the impact of the different variables on constitutional 
outcomes, the project presents a comparative analysis of a selected number of civil 
and political rights in both constitutions namely, freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; freedom of expression; and the right to non-discrimination, which were 
subject of dispute throughout the constitution-making processes, measured against the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The researcher 
assumes that the non-Islamists were aiming at reaching a constitution that would have 
been as close as possible to the ICCPR, in order to guarantee the minimum protection 
of rights, while the Islamists were trying to impose their ideological views. The 
researcher assumes that this analysis shows how the different variables mentioned 
above shaped the outcome in terms of producing constitutional documents that 
represent either a compromise with the non-Islamist opposition's vision or a 
breakaway.  
The researcher poises the following three questions: Why did Islamists in 
Egypt, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, gain a qualified 
majority at the constituent assembly, while Ennahda Islamists in Tunisia gained only 
a simple majority? How did having a qualified majority in Egypt as opposed to a 
simple majority in Tunisia impact the proceedings of constitution-making process in 
each country? Finally, how did the design of the constitution-making process impact 
the constitutional outcome? 
Research Objectives  
The objectives of the master's project are the following: (1) to examine the 
constitution-making processes in both Egypt and Tunisia since these processes had a 
central role in shaping the transition processes in both countries, (2) make use of the 
constitution-making literature to develop a conceptual framework that explains the 
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variables that enabled Islamists in Egypt to have a predominant majority at the 
constituent assembly, while Ennahda Islamists gained only a simple majority, (3) 
examine how these different majorities impacted the proceedings of the constitution-
making in both countries; (4) examine how the design of the constitution-making 
process shaped the outcome, and (5) present recommendations and lessons learned 
from the experience of both countries, which could provide directions for future 
research on constitution-making. 
Importance of the Research and Client Description 
This master's project is significant as it deals with the constitution-making 
process as a political project that reflected the powers and interests of the social and 
political actors involved and that also helped in shaping the character of the new 
regime in both countries. There is a little attention on constitution-making process   in 
the recent literature covering the transitions in the MENA region (Lang, 2013). 
Accordingly, it was important to analyze the constitution-making processes in both 
countries to define the variables that impacted both processes and led to different 
outcomes.    
 The master's project could provide insights for scholars, researchers, or policy 
makers who are interested in analyzing what is referred to as the "Arab Spring" 
transitions. It suggests a conceptual framework to understand the variables that 
influence the process of constitution-making and outcome. The project also presents 
conclusions and lessons learned that could be used as a basis for a constitution-
making theory or model. 
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Methodology and Case Selection 
Methodology 
 Method 
The master's project adopts a comparative research method by presenting a 
comparative description of the different phases of constitution-making processes in 
Egypt and Tunisia, starting with the stage prior to the drafting of the constitution 
(setting the agenda stage), continuing with the actual process of constitution-making 
(the proceedings), and finally comparing a selected number of civil and political 
rights in both constitutions to the ICCPR, which is used as a yardstick case. The 
project develops a conceptual framework to identify the relevant variables of the 
constitution-making process. 
Data Collection   
The primary sources of data are the texts of the 2012 Egyptian and the 2014 
Tunisians constitutions and the ICCPR. Secondary sources of data are the literature 
about the constitution-making processes in the two countries. This literature includes 
the following: (1) reports that document the constitution-making processes in both 
countries (2) early drafts of both constitutions, which are available online; (3) reports 
that document the constitution-making processes in both countries; and (4) the 
available media statements and available interviews previously done with prominent 
members of the constituent assemblies.  
Case Selection 
The project focuses on the 2012 Egyptian and the 2014 Tunisian constitution-
making processes which produced the first two constitutions that emerged from the 
Arab uprising. They are two exemplary cases, which are worth examining, of two 
constitution-making processes that took place in quite similar contexts and faced the 
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same risks, yet one process went wrong and the other managed to overcome the risks 
and avoid transition breakdown.  
The ICCPR will be used as a baseline in analyzing the constitutional outcomes 
for the following reasons: (1) It is a binding treaty that is part of the International Bill 
of Human Rights along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
(2) It is an international legal frame of reference of the fundamental civil and political 
rights. (3) It is considered as "the most comprehensive and well-established UN treaty 
on civil and political rights" (Joseph, Schultz, & Castan, 2000). (4) The majority of 
the UN state members are parties to the covenant, including Egypt and Tunisia.  
Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the 
literature on constitution-making in transition and presents a conceptual framework 
that indentifies the relevant variables of the constitution-making process. Each of the 
three subsequent chapters answers one of the research questions of the thesis project. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first question by examining the independent variables that 
were at stake at the first phase of the constitution-making process in both countries, 
namely the background factors, and the rules and mechanisms set for the constitution-
making process and led to different majorities of Islamists at both constituent 
assemblies. Chapter 3 tackles the second question and explains how the Islamist 
majorities interacted with other political and social actors within the rules set for the 
process and which impacted the proceedings of the constitution-making process 
(intermediate variable), which in turned shaped the constitutional outcome. The 
constitutional outcomes are analyzed in Chapter 4 as mentioned previously. Finally, 
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Chapter 5 provides research results, learned lessons, and possible directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on constitution-making in transition. In the 
first section, the concept of transition is defined and the development of the concept in 
the literature is traced. The researcher sheds light on the traditional paradigm of 
constitution-making and the gaps in the transition scholarship. In the second section, 
the concepts of constitution and constitutionalism are defined. Other items are also 
examined including the development of constitution-making literature since its 
foundation as distinctive field, the design of the constitution-making process, and 
finally the gaps in the constitution-making literature. The second part of this chapter 
outlines the conceptual framework of the master's project which is developed from the 
constitution-making scholarship, as well as the hypothesis of the project.  
Transition from Authoritarian Rule and Importance of Constitution-Making 
Definition and Development of Transition 
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the concept of transition as used to refer 
to a change in political regime was central in scholarship with the fall of authoritarian 
regimes4 in South America, Central America, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 
as cited in El-Wahishi, 2013, p. 6). The concept of transition was first introduced by 
Dankwart Rustow in his 1970 article "Transitions towards a Dynamic Model". 
Rustow defines transition as a process towards democracy. He challenged the political 
                                                           
4 The term authoritarian is used to refer loosely to "all non-democratic systems, including one-party 
systems, totalitarian systems, personal dictatorships, military regimes, and the like" (Huntington, 1991, 
p. 13).  
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scientists of his time who had focused on what he referred to as the functional 
questions of democracy: "What conditions make democracy possible and what 
conditions make it thrive?" Such questions, Rustow argued, are of little help for 
scholars studying developing regions, such as the Middle East and Southern Asia. 
Rustow instead shifted the focus to what he had referred to as “the genetic question” 
and presented his model of how a democracy comes into existence (Rustow, 1970, pp. 
337-340; Rustow as cited in Diamond, Fukuyama, Horowitz, & Plattner, 2014). 
This concept of transition was further developed in the four-volume work 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead and published in 1986. They define transition 
quite broadly as "the interval between one political regime and another" (O’Donnell 
& Schmitter, 1986, p. 7). In the last volume, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Uncertain Conclusions, authored by O’Donnell and Schmitter, the authors argued that 
"transition could be from certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain something 
else" (p. 3). Transition could lead to "the installation of some form of democracy, the 
return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary 
alternative" (p. 7). Their model focused on only one particular path for transitions, 
which is neither violent nor revolutionary but "proceeds through negotiation between 
the outgoing authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition, and often relies upon 
formal or informal pacts or agreements that provide security guarantees to both sides" 
(Diamond et al., 2014, p. 87). The template of transition elaborated by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, on the basis of the southern European and Latin American transitions, 
postulates that a "transfer of power" or a "surrender  of power", where those who hold 
control of the state negotiate the transition with some faction of their supporters or 
some of their non-maximalist opponents, seems more likely to attain and consolidate 
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political democracy than transition as an "overthrow of power" by implacable 
antagonists (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 7). The authors argued that the 
parameters that cause transitions from authoritarian rule are in flux and that the rules 
of the political game during transition are not defined; actors struggle and contest not 
only to satisfy their immediate interests and the interests of those whom they 
represent but also define the rules and procedures that would likely determine the 
winners and losers in the future (pp. 4-6). They also highlighted that democracy does 
not necessarily require a fixed set of economic or cultural prerequisites and that the 
elite's interactions are key during transition.  
The scholarship of transition and democratization was further developed in the 
seminal work of Samuel Huntington's Democracy's Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century (1991). Huntington referred to the wave of transition, 
which began in 1974 with the Portuguese revolution, including the democratic 
transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, Asia Pacific countries, and Eastern Europe 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as democracy's third wave (Huntington, 1991). 
For Huntington, transition to a democratic political system can be defined based on 
"the extent that [this system] most powerful collective decision-makers are selected 
through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates clearly compete for 
votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 
1991, pp. 6-7). Huntington believed in the importance of individual agents in the 
transition to democracy: “democracies are created not by causes but by causers” 
(Huntington 1991, p. 107). Transition was based on elites’ choices, perceptions, 
beliefs, and actions, while subsequent consolidation was based on elite pacts and 
consensus. For democracies to come into being, "future political elites", who are the 
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main actors in the transition into democracy, "will have to believe, at a minimum, that 
democracy is the least bad form" (Huntington, 1991, p. 34). 
Ineffectiveness of Traditional Transition Paradigm  
A number of scholars refuted Huntington's third wave democratization theory 
and the traditional transition paradigm, calling for developing new frameworks, new 
debates, and maybe eventually a new paradigm that helps us understand the 
transitions that are underway (Schmitter, 2010; Carothers, 2002; Munck, 2011). In his 
"Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings" (2010), Schmitter reflected on the model 
presented in the four-volume work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. He stated 
that the model does not seem to work well everywhere and that democracy is an 
unfinished product; therefore, democratization will always remain the research agenda 
of political scientists (p. 28). Thomas Carothers (2002) also called for an end to the 
transition paradigm in his seminal work, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", as it 
is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model (Carothers, 
2002, pp. 5-6). Carothers challenged the core assumptions upon which the traditional 
transition paradigm was based. He argued that not just any country moving away from 
dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy. The clear 
majority of the third-wave countries, however, have not even achieved a relatively 
well-functioning democracy. Most of these transitional countries have entered what 
Carothers referred to as a gray zone; they are "neither dictatorial nor clearly headed 
toward democracy" (p. 9).  It is the time for the democracy-promotion community to 
get rid of the transition paradigm since it was the product of a certain time and adopt 
instead an approach that focuses on the key political patterns of each country.  
 Another weakness in transition scholarship is that the focus is mainly on 
transitions from autocracy to democracy, although since World War II, "only about 
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45% of more than half of regime changes were transitions from one autocracy to 
another" (Geddes, Wright, Frantz, 2012, p. 3). There are three possible outcomes 
when a dictator is ousted: regime survival under new leadership, democratization, and 
replacement by a new autocratic regime (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2012). There is 
a need, therefore, for advancing the literature on transition to understand how 
transition happens and addressing the question raised by the Arab Spring: "in what 
circumstances is the ouster of a dictator likely to lead to democratization rather than 
renewed autocracy or chaos?" (Stradiotto and Guo, 2010, p. 4). 
Landau (2012) argued that the key question in the literature of transition 
should not be how an old regime was overthrown but rather how a new one can be 
constructed, which is a gap in the transition scholarship. The collapse of the old 
regime generally results in the chaotic emergence of political parties and civil society 
groups, whose interactions determine the construction of the new regime's governing 
institutions. The traditional theory of revolution holds that "revolution occurs 
precisely when there is a decisive legal break with the old constitutional or legal 
order. Once such a break has occurred, the state is in a kind of legal no-man's land 
until the new constitutional order has been constructed" (Kelsen, as cited in Landau 
2012, p. 612). In these situations of uncertainty, constitution-making is likely to be 
key means of shaping the character of the new regime at the hand of the political and 
social groups who hold power (Landau, 2012, pp. 611-614).  
Constitution-Making Process 
 Constitution and Constitutionalism 
Historically, human societies had a form of written rules or practices that 
regulate the relations between its members (Saunders, 2012). The modern notion of 
the constitution, as a single document of constitutional rules regarded as a supreme or 
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fundamental law, overriding all other law and government action, began in the late 
18th century following the adoption of written constitutions, between 1780 and 1791, 
for the United States, Poland, and France (Saunders, 2012; Elster, 2995).  
There is a lack of consensus on defining the concepts of "constitution" and 
"constitutionalism". Several definitions are derived from social sciences and others 
positivist legal theory (Sweet, 2009, p. 623-624). Eslter (1995) defined it as a supreme 
system of rules that regulate fundamental matter, and amendments to it are legally 
more difficult to secure than ordinary legislation. Sweet (2009) defined it "a body of 
meta-norms, those higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how all other 
lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted" (p. 
626). A number of scholars, such as Hardin (2003), Eslster (2000), and Hart Ely 
(1980) (as cited in Vermeule, 2014, p. 9), offer several answers to what constitutions 
do: constitutions create and empower government; constitutions tie the hands of 
majorities in ways that protect majorities from their own predictable excesses; 
constitutions protect the rights of discrete and insular minorities; constitutions further 
moral principles of equality, freedom, and human dignity; and, most generally, 
constitutions design democracy. Defining the concept of constitutionalism also varies, 
it is defined as "the commitment on the part of any given political community to be 
governed by constitutional rules and principles" (Sweet, 2009, p. 628); Sweet (2009) 
cited Neil Walker's definition of constitutionalism as "the set of beliefs associated 
with the idea of constitutional government.", and Koen Lenaerts' as "limited 
government operating under the rule of law."  
Although there appears to be no single accepted definition of 
constitutionalism, there is a common agreement that "modern constitutionalism 
requires imposing limits on the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, 
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and the protection of fundamental rights. Accordingly, there is an interrelation 
between the concepts of constitution and constitutionalism.  
Elster (1995) postulates that the development of constitutions occur in seven 
waves, with the first wave beginning in the 18th century, and the seventh wave ending 
with a number of former Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe 
adopting new constitutions after the fall of communism in 1989 (pp. 368-369). For 
Elester (1995), constitution-waves are related to the causes of drafting new 
constitutions, which are almost always written in the wake of a crisis or exceptional 
circumstance of some sort: social-economic crisis, revolution, regime collapse, fear of 
regime collapse, defeat in war, reconstruction after war, or creation of a new state (p. 
370-371). There are a number of distinctive features distinguishing contemporary 
constitutions that evolved in the latter part of the 20th century, including universal 
acceptance that the authority for a constitution must derive from the people of the 
state concerned; most constitutions are now made for multi-cultural societies, some of 
which are, or have been, in conflict; the involvement of the international community, 
or segments of it; and the emphasis on process as opposed to the content of the 
constitution (Saunders, 2012, p. 3-4) 
Constitution-Making Scholarship 
The literature that deals with the process of constitution-making has been part 
of a larger substantive body of writings on constitutionalism, comparative 
constitutional law, and constitutional politics. The modern concept of constitution-
making as a distinctive field of analysis can be traced back to Elster (1995) who noted 
that there is no body of literature that deals with constitution making in "its full 
generality, as a distinctive object of positive analysis" (Elster, 1995, p. 364). In the 
last fifteen years, there has been outpouring of case studies and empirical analyses of 
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constitution-making episodes, particularly in countries in transition and in post-
conflict (Landau, 2013, p. 925).   
Elster (1995) founded the distinctive body of literature of constitution-making 
by outlining the paradoxes and dilemmas inherited in the constitution-making process. 
The first paradox is that the need for a new constitution generally arises in 
circumstances that are likely to work against good constitution-making. The process 
of constitution-making requires the procedures to be rational and impartial. New 
constitutions are written for the future generations; the constitution makers should 
have a wide horizon and look beyond their own interests. However, the turbulent 
circumstances in which constitution-making usually arises invite procedures based on 
"threat-based bargaining". The extra-political resources of threats, including foreign 
powers, military powers, terrorism, pressure of the public and electoral prospects, 
play a prominent role in the constitutional bargain.  
The second paradox is that it is only under dramatic external circumstances 
that people have the will to get the constitution-making done. This paradox also stems 
from the theory of bargaining: "if it did not matter when people agreed, it would not 
matter whether or not they agreed at all" (Cross, 1965, as cited in Elster, p. 394). 
These paradoxes were evident in the Tunisian and Egyptian constitution-making 
cases, where the need for a new constitution arouse in the aftermath of the removal of 
the ruling regimes and under the pressure of the traumatic events that surrounded the 
constitution-making processes as explained in the following chapters. In short, Elster 
highlights how complex and challenging the constitution-making process is, which 
requires development of a model or paradigm for structuring the constitution-making 
processes.  
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Elster (1995) explains the inner forces involved in the constitution-making 
process or the challenges that face the constitution-makers. The first challenge is the 
relation between the body that is entrusted with drafting the constitution and the 
actor(s) who endowed this body with authority. Elster highlighted the possible tension 
that could take place between the body responsible for writing and its convener who 
may seek to put constrains on the drafting-body, either during the drafting process of 
the ratification process (Elster, 1995, p. 373-375). The second challenge is decision-
making throughout the process of drafting the constitution, that is, how the 
constitution drafters make decisions. In general, smaller groups tend to claim equal 
voting power in the constitution-making body, whereas the larger or majority groups 
insist on a voting system that reflects the numerical strength of their constituencies 
(Elster 1995, pp. 377-381). Another challenge is the interests of individuals or groups 
participating in the constitution-making process, whether political parties or formal 
governmental institutions participating in the drafting process. Groups are likely to 
work to inject their collective interests into the constitutional document (Elster 1995, 
pp. 378-380). Finally, Elster highlighted the dilemma of public versus private 
constitution-writing proceedings. The greater the amount of participation in the 
constitution-making process, the greater is the legitimacy of the resulting outcome. 
However, publicity encourages the "delegates to adopt will resort to open logrolling 
and horsetrading" (Elster, 1995, p. 394).  
Elster proposed a number of recommendations to overcome such challenges 
involved in the constitution-making process: (1) The establishment of a specialized 
constituent committee apart from the ordinary legislative bodies—legislators should 
not be given central role in the ratification to reduce the space of institutional 
interests; (2) The work of the constituent assembly should maintain a balance 
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between publicity and secrecy, since secrecy gives room for bargaining difficult 
issues and helps avoiding rhetorical overbidding, while publicity ensures that 
constitution-makers are abiding by public interests; (3) Elections to the constituent 
assembly should follow the proportional system rather than the majority system  in 
order to have a broadly representative committee; (4) the legislator's role should be 
kept to the minimum, as sometimes ambiguous formulations, which legislators resist, 
are needed to reach consensus; and (5) the constituent assembly work within a 
defined, reasonable time limit to avoid delaying techniques and at the same time to 
reduce short-term and partisan motives (p. 396). Although Elster did not provide s a 
robust model of constitution-making, his recommendations became the basis for 
scholarship on constitution-making (Ginsburg, Elkins, Blount, 2009). Elster's 
recommendations have been developed in the constitution-making literature into 
hypotheses that are being tested by studying individual cases.  
Several studies have been developed that tackle the process of constitution-
making distinctively. Widner (2007) identified the different phases of constitution-
making as drafting, consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification. Banting and 
Simeon (1985) introduced an earlier stage focusing on mobilization of interests (and 
counter interests) prior to the preparation of a text, which they call the “idea-
generating stage”. Saunders (2012) divided the constitution-making process into three 
stages: the period during which a range of critical preliminary decisions about a 
constitution-making process are made, which she refers to as the setting an “agenda”; 
the various processes for design, drafting, agreement and approval; and the final 
phase of constitutional implementation.  
The agenda setting phase is the stage before the actual start of the 
constitution-making itself, during which a number of decisions should be taken about 
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the process itself. These decisions include whether to make a new constitution or to 
amend the existing one, the nature of the constitution-making body and whether 
elections are required for this body, strategies for public participation, how the state is 
to be governed during the constitution-making period, and procedures for approval 
and ratification of the final draft constitution (Saunders, 2012, pp. 4-5). The stage is 
challenging since constitutions are usually written in turbulent circumstances, yet is 
essential as it shapes the subsequent phases.  
The second stage involves the drafting process, agreement on the draft as a 
whole, and procedures for bringing the constitution into effect. The drafting process 
could be undertaken by a body of experts, elected body which could be a regular 
legislature or a specially constituted constitutional assembly, or a referendum 
(Saunders, 2012, pp. 4-5).  
The final phase of a constitution-making process is implementation. This 
phase extends for an indefinite period from the time the constitution is passed. A wide 
range of actions needs to be taken to give any constitution effect (Saunders, 2012, pp. 
4-5). This master's project focuses on the first and second stages of constitution-
making.  
Recent studies have given special attention to the relation between the 
constitutional design process and the outcomes (Widner, 2007; Ginsburg et al., 2009). 
Scholars have argued that "there are as many variables that are present throughout the 
process as there are constitutions" (Ginsburg et al., 2009, p. 4). The most common 
cited variables are the involvement of various actors (constituent assemblies, 
executives, ordinary legislatures, and public participation) along the different phases 
of constitution-making, international actors, inclusive versus participatory 
constitution making, the intensity and continuity of an internal crisis while the 
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constitution is being made, and the timeframe (Samuels, 2006; Moehler, 2008; 
Ginsburg et al., 2009; Moehler & Marchant, 2012). The relations, however, between 
each of these variables and the constitutional outcomes are still only assumptions or 
hypotheses that are not yet tested against enough evidence (Ginsburg et al., 2009).  
There is a consensus in the literature that the constitution-making process is an 
integral part of the outcomes which govern the political transition. However, there is 
hardly any systemic understanding of the impact of the different variables of the 
constitutional processes on the outcomes since constitutions are written in highly 
charged, divided, and often violent environments (Samuels, 2006, p.20). Ginsburg et 
al. (2009) highlight that a key normative question is whether aspects of process can 
be manipulated to reduce the probability of failures, a question that requires more 
work on the complex relationships among process, content, and outcomes (219). 
Widner and her collaborators in 2007 started a project to analyze all cases of 
constitution-making from 1975 to 2007 aiming at "formulating systematic measures 
of the influence of the design of constitution-drafting processes on a variety of 
outcomes" (Widner, 2008). Widner grouped the outcomes of the constitution-making 
process into: (1) "behavioral outcomes" which include the ability of drafters to take 
long views and compromise, discuss and deliberate instead of horse-trading; (2) 
outcomes related to the clarity of the text and the ability to handle future challenges; 
(3) "attitudinal outcomes", which include legitimate matters and how people think of 
the constitution, and (4) "broader outcomes" that include endurance and efficacy 
(Widner, 2008).  
Landau's “Risk-Averse” Model  
The literature of constitution-making is loaded with propositions and 
hypotheses that still need to be developed into a solid theory or hypothesis. Landau 
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(2013) highlighted that a major challenge of constitution-making is that both 
constitutional theory and international law and politics have stayed silent about 
constitution-making processes, and have both deemphasized the constitution-making 
process itself as an object of study, allowing it to occur in a vacuum without any real 
restraints on these processes (p. 611). In addition, the recent scholarship of 
constitution-making does not give enough attention to the main risk of constitution-
making: powerful individuals or political parties use either real or manufactured 
majorities to impose constitutions on the rest of their societies (p. 613). Constitution-
making establishes the legitimacy of the new regime across a broad spectrum of social 
groups. But constitution-making is equally risky; the constitution-making process is 
commonly abused by actors who seized to impose their agendas or try to consolidate 
power, which will lead to establishing poorly functioning and unstable states (p. 613). 
Thus, an important, yet challenging task for scholars is to construct models that 
constrain the abuse of the constitution. Landau argued that policy makers and scholars 
should not focus solely on designing constitution-making in an attempt to reach some 
idealized end state, but rather on developing a "risk averse" model of 
constitutionalism, where the major goal is to prevent democratic breakdown (Landau, 
2013, p. 613).  
Landau (2012) criticized the existing literature on constitution-making, which 
is derived mainly from Elster's conception of constitution-making as a deliberative 
process where the role of group and institutional interests is deemphasized (p. 923). 
Elster's recommendations, thus, were designed to force drafters to consider the long-
term interests of the country rather than their immediate short-term political goals. 
These recommendations include, as mentioned previously, establishing special 
chambers such as constitutional assemblies rather than ordinary legislatures, and not 
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allowing delegates to run for office immediately after serving in the assembly (p.631). 
However, Elster's framework does not address the major risk of the majority's abuse 
of the constitution-making process. The central challenge to constitution-making is 
how to constrain unilateral exercise of power. If political forces represented in the 
assemblies are left unconstrained or poorly constrained, they can reshape the whole 
transitional process to create a quasi-authoritarian regime or impose their own 
constitutions on a minority which in turn would led to constitutional breakdown 
(Landau, 2012, p. 923).   
Landau (2012) postulated that the key problem in developing a risk-averse 
model is to find credible and effective constraints that may deter the majority's abuse 
of the constitution-making process. Different forms of control of constitution-making 
processes may have different levels of efficacy, and they are context specific to a 
large extent. Landau based his model on a number of points that should be considered 
in the designing of the constitution-making process. (1) External constraints over the 
constitution-making process (either from the executive government or the judiciary 
for example) can be problematic and must be carefully designed in order to prove 
effective. External constraints are problematic in any form. It is probably better to 
prioritize measures that ensure that the assembly is internally diverse, so that no single 
faction can act unilaterally (p. 962). (2) Assemblies that are internally diverse, and 
where single parties or factions do not achieve clear majorities, tend to induce broad 
pacting between political groupings. It is important for designers of constitution-
making processes to prioritize electoral rules and other instruments that will help to 
achieve diversity. Among the measures of achieving diversity in the constituent 
assembly is the electoral law. Proportional electoral systems helped to ensure that no a 
single political actor would gain a predominant majority, unlike the majoritarian 
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system (p. 963). (3) Timing also plays a role is preventing one faction from 
dominating the constitution-making process. Constitution-making usually occurs 
during turbulent times. However, accelerating the election of the constituent assembly 
immediately after the fall of the old regime may result in the domination of the more 
organized fraction in the assembly. This suggests that timing can sometimes make a 
big difference in determining how an assembly is composed and thus what 
constitutional program it enacts (pp. 963-964). (4) The forum of the constitution-
making should also be considered: whether constitution-making is better carried out 
in ordinary legislatures or instead in specialized constitutional assemblies. Landau 
argued that it depends more on how the forum is composed and controlled than on 
what kind of forum it is. (5) Landau (2012) discussed the role of public participation 
as a constraint in the constitution-making process. The efficacy of this variable is not 
certain, since in some cases public participation may cause what Elster called “threat-
based bargaining”, as opposing factions may attempt to mobilize portions of the 
masses in order to pressure the other side into a favorable deal. The trouble is once the 
masses on each side are mobilized and ideologically charged, the range of possible 
agreement may be narrowed, perhaps even causing it to disappear entirely (p. 969). 
Public participation could be helpful in some circumstances; however, in poorly 
institutionalized environments, mass participation can actually help contribute to a 
democratic breakdown (p. 970).  
In conclusion, a number of contemporary studies criticize the traditional 
transition paradigm that had developed in the 1980s for failing to account for the 
recent transitional modes that have been taking place or for failing to present a 
generalized model that could structure the various parameters that are at stake during 
transition, which could lead to the establishment of a democratic and inclusive 
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governance. During the uncertainty of transition, constitution-making has emerged as 
a key process for shaping the character of the new regime. However, the literature 
lacks any theory of constitution-making or a model or a paradigm that helps structure 
the process. There is also a need to develop a theory that provides systemic 
understanding of the impact of the different variants of the constitutional processes on 
the outcomes. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conceptual framework of the master's project can be summarized in 
Figure (1) that works as a map that sets the project direction. Based on the scholarship 
of constitution-making, the researcher has developed a conceptual framework that 
identifies a number of factors (independent variables) that influenced the constitution-
making process (intermediate variable), which, in turn, shaped the outcome 
(dependent variable).  
 These variables are among the factors pointed out by Elster (1995) and 
Landau (2013) that should be considered in the constitution-making process including 
Background factors 
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Rules and Mechanisms 
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process  
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the following: (1) the establishment of a specialized constituent committee apart from 
the ordinary legislative bodies. (2) The role of legislators and institutional interests in 
the constitution-making process. (3) Electoral system for establishing the constituent 
assembly. (4) The decision-making rules throughout the process of drafting the 
constitution, i.e. how the constitution drafters take decisions. In general, smaller 
groups tend to claim equal voting power in the constitution-making body; whereas the 
larger or majority groups insist on a voting system that reflects the numerical strength 
of their constituencies, which is a central challenge in the constitution-making 
processes in both Tunisian and Egypt. (5) The risk of having a majority that 
manipulates and abuses the constitution-making process, and (6) The time limit and 
delaying technique of the constitution-making process.   
The framework begins by outlining the independent variables that led to 
different Islamists' majorities at the constituent assemblies. First, there are 
background factors or the "usable past" (Stepan, 2012), that is, the social and political 
milieu of both countries. These factors either directly or indirectly determined the 
weight and the role of the social and political actors who were part of the constitution-
making process. In Tunisia, on the one hand, Bourguiba's modernization project laid 
down the foundation of a progressive and urban state with a high literacy rate and 
vibrant civil society, where religion ceased to exist in the public sphere, and religious 
institutions and education were monitored by the state. Egypt, on the other hand, went 
through different stages since 1952 revolution that resulted in dramatic political and 
social transformations, which led to lack of a strong opposition movement, lack of a 
vibrant civil society, significantly increased religiosity and conservatism in the 
Egyptian society since the 1970s, and the rise of Islamists groups with wide public 
support.   
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The second independent variables are mechanisms and rules that were set for 
managing the constitution-making process, referred to in this master's project as 
setting the agenda phase, including the management of the transition processes in both 
countries, establishing the electorate bodies, and the electoral laws for the constituent 
assemblies in both countries. The electoral law for the assembly in Tunisia was 
drafted by a representative committee, whereas in Egypt the electoral law for the 
parliament was enacted by the SCAF. The electoral law in Tunisia was intentionally 
designed to avoid the domination of one particular group, while that was not the case 
in Egypt when the predominant-Islamist parliament elected the constituent assembly. 
Accordingly, the researcher assumes that these independent variables led to a more 
representative constituent assembly in Tunisia, unlike Egypt where the assembly was 
predominately Islamist.    
The different Islamist majorities interacting with other political and social 
actors within the rules, which had been set for the process, impacted the proceedings 
of the constitution-making process (intermediate variable), which in turned shaped the 
constitutional outcome. The intermediate variable is the actual process of negotiating 
the constitutional texts in both countries, and adopting the texts either within the 
constituent assemblies or in a public referendum. In Tunisia, Ennahda Islamists, who 
only gained a simple majority at the constituent assembly, were forced to form a 
coalition with other two secular parties, which still did not give the Islamists a two-
thirds majority that would have enabled it to pass a constitution alone as per the 
assembly bylaws. Accordingly, reaching consensus appeared to be the only option to 
avoid submitting the constitution for a national referendum. The situation in Egypt 
was quite different. Having a qualified majority, the Islamists were not obliged to 
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reach a consensus, which was evident during the actual process of negotiating the 
constitutional texts. 
Finally, the different variables mentioned above shaped the constitutional 
outcomes (dependent variables). In examining the constitutional outcomes, the project 
presents a comparative analysis of a selected number of civil and political rights in 
both constitutions, namely freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of 
expression; and the right to non-discrimination, measured against the ICCPR, the 
international legal frame of reference of the fundamental civil and political rights. The 
researcher has chosen these articles as they represent the central underpinnings of 
inclusive and democratic governance, and they were among the central areas of 
disagreement between the Islamist and non-Islamist actors. 
Hypothesis 
The background variables and the rules and mechanisms set for managing the 
constitution-making process, influence the intermediate variables, which in turn 
determine the outcome of the process. In other words, the economic, social and 
cultural aspects in each country, on the one hand, and policies of the political regimes 
towards Islamist and non-Islamist political forces, on the other hand, determine the 
weights of these forces in the constitution-making process and the rules governing this 
process. These rules, in turn, determine the outcomes of constitution-making. This 
project is concerned with the articles on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; 
freedom of expression; and the right to non-discrimination as outcomes of the 
process. The lighter the weight of the Islamist forces, the closest the outcomes will be 
to the standards set by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).  
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CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE AGENDA PHASE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first question of the master's project: Why did 
Islamists manage to gain a qualified majority in Egypt, while the Ennahda Islamist 
party in Tunisia only achieved a simple majority? The chapter examines the factors 
which the researcher has identified as independent variables: the background factors 
that had, either directly or indirectly, influenced the whole transitional process, 
resulting in adopting different mechanisms, and the rules and mechanisms adopted in 
both countries which led to different Islamic majorities in the constituent assemblies. 
The chapter is divided into two parts; each part tackles an independent variable in 
addition to a concluding section.  
Background Factors 
A number of analysts have argued that the deeper structural components of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian societies are among the main factors that should be considered 
in analyzing the transitional processes in both countries (Masoud, 2014; Brownlee, 
Masoud, & Reynolds, 2013; Barhouma, 2014; Zakria, 2014). The broader historical, 
social, economic, and cultural factors, which made Tunisia more urban, literate, and 
globalized with a diverse and strong civil society, as compared to Egypt should be 
underlined. These factors shaped the milieu within which the whole constitution-
making process took place and determined the weight of different social and political 
actors who managed the transition.  
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Social Change in Tunisia Since 1956 
Since Tunisia gained independence in 1956, the Neo-Dustur party leaders, 
Habib Bourguiba and his associates, who led the Tunisian independence struggle, 
started a social change program which aimed at instilling the values of modernity and 
progress (Perkins, 1986). The secular western-educated leaders prompted changes that 
laid the ground-work for societal transformation in a number of areas, most notably in 
the nature and the role of education, the judiciary system, and the status of women. 
These reforms created a more liberal, open, and progressive atmosphere than existed 
in other Arab countries (Perkins, 1986, p. 117 -130).  
Bourguiba introduced Islam as the official religion of the country in the 
Independent Tunisian constitution in 1959, yet the constitution guaranteed freedom of 
worship to the followers of the other faiths. He established a unified judiciary system 
and abolished both the Islamic Sharia courts and the French tribunals established 
during the French protectorate, paving the way for the introduction of a Personal 
Status Code5, which provided a progressive legal framework for women’s rights 
(Perkins, 1986, pp. 117-130). In his framework of modernization, Bourguiba placed 
great importance on the need for a unified and centralized education system, under 
which the state could monitor all the schools including the religious ones, starting 
from the Children's Qura'nic schools to the Zaituna Mosque-University, the most 
important Islamic institution in the country (Perkins, 1986, p. 121). Bourguiba also 
established a public education system patterned on the French model (Perkins, 1986, 
p. 123). His efforts towards expanding Tunisians' educational opportunities for boys 
                                                           
5 The Code was a daring undertaking, which could be considered a revolution against the traditional 
interpretation of Islam. The Code panned polygamy, required women's consent to marriage, set a 
minimum age for marriage, and raised women's shares in inheritance (Perkins, 1986, p. 125). It is also 
worth mentioning that Bourguiba started a public campaign against the women's veil and traditional 
forms of dress (Perkins, 1986).  
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and girls raised the national literacy to over 60%6, one of the highest in the Arab 
World (Perkins, 1986, p. 123). Education was regarded as the best means of 
producing a national atmosphere conducive to social change and modernization. In 
short, Bourguiba's framework of modernization aimed at achieving economic 
developments but also progressive societal changes through reforming the education 
system and the legislations. Bourguiba's project had a secular outlook; he held firm 
control over traditional Islamic institutions and practices. He had founded the modern, 
liberal, and urban state of Tunisia.  
Political Milieu 
Bourguiba's project, however, did not build political pluralism. Bourguiba 
dominated the politics of Tunisia from independence until 1987; it was not until the 
early 1980s that opposition political parties were legalized. The dominant and 
centralized role of the state and the ruling party, Neo-Dustur, renamed in 1964 as the 
Socialist Dustorian Party (PSD), hindered the development of a strong opposition 
movement (Alexander, 1997). Tunisia, however, had a vibrant civil society and strong 
labor and students unions that generated pressure on the state in the 1970s and early 
1980s (Alexander, 1997). With the rising economic discontent and mounting 
opposition, Bourguiba cracked down hard on the labor union, leftist student 
organizations, and the rising Islamist movement in 1984-1985 (Alexander, 1997). 
After the ouster of Bourguiba in 1987, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali began a honeymoon, 
which did not last long, between the new regime and the opposition (Halliday, 1990). 
He promised to start political reforms and called for political pluralism and respect for 
human rights. He revamped Bourguiba’s Party Socialist Destourien (PSD) into the 
                                                           
6 The current literacy rate in Tunisia according to UNCIF statistics (2008-2012) is 79.1%.   
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Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), and issued a new legislation that made it 
easier to form associations and parties (Halliday, 1990). He opened a dialogue with 
the opposition forces, socialist and Islamist, and amnestied hundreds of political 
prisoners and allowed thousands of exiled opposition to return home. The media also 
reflected a more open atmosphere (Halliday, 1990). The country, however, shortly 
after slid into deeper authoritarianism, when Ben Ali’s RCD won every seat in the 
1989 legislative elections. Ben Ali stepped up a campaign to quash any form of 
opposition; he manipulated the press, unions, and other students and human rights 
organizations. He also dramatically expanded Tunisia’s internal security apparatus, in 
addition to persecuting workers, human rights activists, opposition figures, and 
university professors (Alexander, 1997). Such repressive strategy culminated in Ben 
Ali's ouster in the 2010 uprising.  
The Islamist Movement in Tunisia 
The Islamist movement in Tunisia started in the late 1960s, at the tremulous 
time when the Arab defeat in the 1967 war generated criticism of the “secular 
nationalism” dominant in many Arab countries at that time (Alexander, 2012). Like 
their counterparts in other Arab countries, the Tunisian Islamists blamed the Arab 
defeat on the Arab rulers, who had abandoned their religious and cultural roots 
(Alexander, 2012). Within Tunisia, the political and economic problems afflicting the 
country in 1970s and 1980s contributed to the appeal of Islamist movement that 
promulgated the view that forsaking Islamic principles had caused and aggravated 
these problems (Perkins, 1986, p. 120). The Islamist movement presented itself as a 
countervailing effort of Bourgiba's modernization efforts, which according to them, 
undermined religious values and imposed on the society alien values outside their 
culture in the name of modernization (Perkins, 1986). The Islamist movement 
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attracted many Tunisians, particularly university and secondary-school students, since 
it was one of the few available means of opposing the regime rather than out of 
sympathy with their ideology. Also, for others, joining the Islamist movement was a 
means of expressing the distress over the alien cultural values which had penetrated 
the Tunisian society (Perkins, 1986, p. 120).   
The Islamist movement started with the establishment of the Association for 
the Safeguard of the Qur'an (Jamyet Al-Mohafza 3la al-Qura'n) in 1970, which the 
government established to counter the left opposition (Alexander, 2012). Young 
Islamists who started to gather at this association, such as Rachid al Ghannouchi and 
Abdelfattah Mourou, grew up in religious families of modest means and received 
traditional religious education. They were at odds with the culture and values of 
Tunisia’s secular, francophone elite. Some Islamists also spent time in Syria and 
Egypt, including Ghannouchi himself, where they were influenced by the teachings of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1960s (Alexander, 2012). At the beginning, the Islamist 
group focused primarily on religious and cultural issues; they worked on educating 
Tunisians about Islamic religious and cultural values through lectures and writing. In 
the 1970s, Bourguiba's crackdown on the labor movement and the leftist student 
organizations created a political void that the Islamists stepped to fill. They began 
recruiting in secondary school and university campuses. They also took steps to create 
a stronger organizational structure, and in 1979, a group of young Islamists headed by 
Al-Ghannouchi established a new organization called the Islamic Group (AL Jama' 
Al-Islamyia) (Tamimi, 2014). Ghannouchi's thought and development of his 
movement were influenced during this period by a series of major developments: the 
emergence of the liberal democratic current following the 1978 violent confrontation 
between the trade unions and the government, and on the regional level, the Iranian 
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Revolution and the sociopolitical thought of the Islamist movement in Sudan under 
the leadership of Hasan al-Turabi (Tamimi, 2014). In 1981, the Islamic Group 
changed its name to the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) and published its 
manifesto which expressed the movement's commitment to democratic process and 
affirmed that the electoral process was the source of legitimacy (Tamimi, 2014). 
Bourguiba rejected the movement’s bid for legal recognition, as he regarded it as a 
threat to his modernization project, launching the first of several crackdowns that 
jailed thousands of Islamists in 1981. The regime's repression helped the movement to 
develop by forging ties with the human rights league, the labor movement, and other 
opposition parties. Regardless of the ideological differences, all of these groups 
shared a common desire to replace Bourguiba with a pluralistic political system that 
respected human rights. Accordingly, the discourse that the movement adopted 
reflected these goals (Tamimi, 2014).  
During the first phase of Ben-Ali's regime, a large number of Islamist 
prisoners were amnestied. When Ben-Ali relaxed some controls on political life, the 
MTI leaders changed the party’s name to the Ennahda (Renaissance) Party in order to 
comply with a new law that forbade party names to contain religious references. 
Encouraged by Ben Ali's attempts to democratize the regime, Ghannouchi announced 
that his movement accepted the Personal Status Code (Tamimi, 2014). Ennahda, 
however, was not granted legal status, and the Islamists ran in 1989 elections as 
independents. Ben Ali’s honeymoon with Ennahda ended shortly after the elections, 
and the period between 1989 and 1992 witnessed increased arbitrary arrests, which 
led Ghannouchi to flee Tunisia (Alexander, 2012). The 1990s could be described as 
the darkest chapter in Ennahda political life, when the Tunisian government 
intensified its campaign against Ennahda. While based in London, Ghannouchi 
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maintained contact with supporters in Europe and the Arab world. However, Ben 
Ali’s repression destroyed much of Ennahda’s organization. A rebuilding phase 
started by the 2000s, when the remnants of Ennahda activists, many of whom had 
been in jail since the 1980s and 1990s, began to rebuild the party’s organization. 
Ennahda and several other opposition groups built a joint platform of demands in 
2005, where Ennahda committed itself to a multiparty democracy and to the 
progressive rights that Tunisian women were granted (Alexander, 2012). 
The Ennahda party is relatively well-organized, compared to Tunisia's other 
political parties. It has a clear internal organizational structure, with regular party 
conferences- unlike Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, strong organizational ties between 
grassroots supporters and party leaders, and a governing Shura Council that deter-
mines major party decisions via a one-person, one-vote scheme (Marks, 2014, p.1). 
Ghannouchi emerged as an Islamic thinker and activist distinguished by his endeavors 
to introduce new dimensions in contemporary Islamic thought. He advocated for an 
Islamic model of democracy that is based on the tools and procedures of the Western 
democracy and the Islamic code of ethics and values (Tamimi, 2014, pp. 218-219). In 
a recent statement addressed at the United States Institute of Peace (Ghannouchi: 
Middle East at Crossroads, 29 September, 2014), Ghanouchi took pride in being "the 
first Islamic movement to adopt democracy in 1981, and announce explicitly that it is 
a civic party that believes in democracy, citizenship and civic values. It is a conviction 
which did not change even after the savage wave of repression in the 1990s to which 
we were subjected to by Ben Ali’s regime. Ennahdha remained a peaceful movement 
struggling against dictatorship through democratic methods and rejecting violence and 
extremism".  
35 
To conclude, this section has shed light on the social and political background 
in Tunisia, which had directly or indirectly affected the whole transitional process in 
general and, the constitution-making process in particular. The following points 
should be underlined: (1) Bourguiba's modernization project laid down the foundation 
of a progressive and urban state with a high literacy rate and vibrant civil society. 
Religion ceased to exist in the public sphere, and religious institutions and education 
were monitored by the state. (2) Tunisia had a solid labor movement and strong civil 
society which constituted a strong opposition front under Bourguiba and Ben-Ali. (3) 
The authoritarian regimes of both Ben-Ali and Bourguiba did not allow political 
pluralism; hence, the development of a strong opposition movement was hindered. (4) 
The Islamist movement in Tunisia represented by the Ennahda Islamist party 
committed itself to multi-party democracy and political pluralism and to the 
progressive rights that women were granted. It also forged ties with the human rights 
league, the labor movement, and other opposition parties against the regime's 
repression regardless of the ideological differences. The following section addresses 
the background factors in Egypt.   
Political and Social Transformation: From Nasser to Mubarak  
Egypt went through dramatic social and political changes since the British-
influenced monarchical regime was overthrown in 1952 by the Free Officers, a group 
of junior military officers. Egypt was declared as a republic and the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) led by Gamal Abdl Nasser, one of the Free Officers, took 
charge of the country’s affairs (Osman, 2011). Under President Nasser, who assumed 
the Presidency in 1956 till 1970, Egypt was radically transformed on the social, 
economic and political levels. Nasser's regime ended the liberal political experiment 
from 1920s to 1940s, at the center of which was the liberal Wafd party, which was 
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replaced by strongly socialist doctrine (Osman, 2011). Nasser weakened all political 
parties and established a new system based on a centralized powerful presidency and 
an executive government (Osman, 2011). Political opposition was not tolerated; all 
political parties except for Nasser’s own Arab Socialist Union were declared illegal. 
On the economic level, the Nasser's comprehensive developmental reforms which 
were based on a hugely ambitious industrialization program, the land-reform program, 
major advances in agriculture and cultivation, and establishing a strong public sector 
managed to transfer Egypt form a poor and lethargic economy into a developmental 
case study (Osman, 2011, pp. 50-56). These economic reforms were accompanied by 
large-scale social transformations, since approximately 75% of Egypt's gross 
domestic product (GDP) was transferred from the hands of the country's elites to 
either the state or to millions of workers and laborers (Osman, 2011, p. 53). The 
creation of a dominating public sector flattened the social curve; overall public school 
enrollments more than doubled, and Egyptian middle and lower classes had 
unprecedented access to housing, education, jobs, and health services (Osman, 2011).  
When Nasser passed away in 1970, Anwar Sadat, a member of the free 
officers, assumed power until his assassination at the hands of Islamist 
fundamentalists in 1981. Sadat did not share Nasser’s socialistic leanings and he took 
the country along the path of liberalization (infitah) (Nagarajan, 2013). On the 
political level, he released the political prisoners, allowed the formation of multiple 
party platforms along with the Arab Socialist Union, and then eventually he dissolved 
Nasser’s party to create the National Democratic Party (NDP) (Nassef, 2012). 
However, the end of Sadat's era witnessed a crackdown on the opposition who were 
against the Camp David Accord. On the economic level, Sadat's economic 
liberalization (infitah) policies involved attracting foreign capital and technology, 
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financial institutions, and freeing up the labor markets and public sector (Nagarajan, 
2013). Such policies led to rapid changes in the class structure and wealth distribution 
in favor of those who were already at the top of the economic ladder. The middle 
class was struggling with stagnating income and rising prices, and the lower class 
sunk even further into poverty (Nagarajan, 2013). The economic and political policies 
led to a social shift; in less than a decade, "the civic nature of the Egyptian state of the 
1950s and 1960s was replaced by a quasi-Islamic one and a liberal public atmosphere 
and discourse became predominantly religious and conservative" (Osman, 2011, p. 
92). Egypt witnessed increasing religiosity and conservatism during the 1970s; this 
social transformation was due to the transfer of the Saudi Wahhabi doctrine when 
more than 3 million Egyptian families (most of them from the lower and middle class) 
migrated between 1974 and 1985 to the Gulf. In addition, the politics of the 1970s led 
to this social shift, when President Sadat unleashed Egypt Islamic forces to confront 
the Nasserite and socialist forces (Osman, 2011, pp. 90-92). Thousands of Muslim 
Brotherhood members were released from jail after years of imprisonment and 
prosecution under Nasser, and the Muslim Brothers' old newspaper Da'awa, was 
allowed to be reissued. Sadat was also keen on presenting himself as a pious 
president. He authorized a major increase in the budget of al-Azhar and an expansion 
of its parallel educational system, opened the door for religious figures to dominate 
the state controlled media, and introduced apostasy laws in Egypt after years of a 
highly liberal intellectual atmosphere (Osman, 2011, pp. 90-92). President Sadat 
introduced Sharia into the Egyptian constitution (previous constitutions had only 
stated that Islam was the state religion). Article 2 of the 1971 constitution declared 
that “the principles of the Sharia are a principal source of legislation”, and in 1980, he 
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amended the Article further to make Sharia the principal source of legislation 
(Shehata, 2012). 
After Sadat, Hosny Mubarak, who was the vice-President at that time, 
assumed power. Mubarak did not undertake drastic economic and political changes; 
his policies were not a breakaway from his predecessor. He was keen, at the 
beginning, to take several steps towards making economic and political reforms. He 
released thousands of political prisoners, and relaxed the press censorship. Many civic 
society organizations were allowed to function (Nagarajan, 2013). Although the NDP 
retained its solid grip on the government and the Parliament, the opposition ran 
parliamentary elections. The liberal Wafd party, absent from the public realm since 
1952, re-emerged, and its members built a parliamentary coalition in 1984 with 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned group at that time, who ran as 
independents (Nagarajan, 2013). Mubarak relaxed the media censorship and also 
allowed political opposition groups to publish their own newspapers, a sharp turn 
from the closed media under Sadat and Nasser (Nassef, 2012). Unlike Sadat, Mubarak 
was not interested in making major political transformations. He instead focused on 
making economic improvements and building the country’s infrastructure (Osman, 
2011). However, the last decade of Mubarak's era witnessed the ascent of the 
capitalist elite of the then ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The regime’s 
capitalists asserted their power over major economic sectors and dominated the 
political scene through the NDP and dominating the Parliament through flawed 
elections (Osman, 2011). Such policies along with the widespread government 
corruption, suppression of opposition, and the grotesque abuses of the regime’s 
security apparatus paved the way to the fall of Mubarak's regime.    
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The Islamist Movement   
Egypt was the cradle of the Islamist movement. It started with the foundation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood as a social and religious club at the hands of the 
charismatic school teacher, Hassan Al-Banna, in 1928 in Islamlyia, where there were 
the headquarter of the Suez Canal company and a sizeable foreign community. Al-
Banna founded his Da'awa (call to religion) on preaching against the dangers of 
emulating the European lifestyle that was imposed on the Egyptian society 
(Moussalli, 2014). Al-Banna believed that the Muslim societies were weak because 
they abandoned their faith, and that it was only through reviving Islam and the role of 
religion in everyday life and politics, including application of Sharia, or Islamic law 
(Shehata, 2012). His holistic conception7 of Islam as a holistic and all-embracing 
system was recurrent in his writings and messages to his followers. Being a 
charismatic leader, Al-Banna inspired, at the beginning, a large number of lower-
middle class workers with his project to regenerate society through Islam. The 
movement won quick and remarkable appeal, and it subsequently became a country-
wide political movement with a large number of branches throughout Egypt, in 
addition to branches in Sudan, Syria, and Iraq (Moussalli, 2014). The growth of the 
movement was dramatic; it became "the grandfather of more than eighty-five other 
Islamist groups in dozens of countries well beyond the Arab world” (Shehata, 2012).  
The Brotherhood in Egypt evolved considerably in different phases over the 
eight decades after its establishment, until it came to power in 2011/2012. The 
movement developed from a social welfare society devoted to Islamic revival, social 
reform, and charity work to become increasingly involved in politics in the 1930s. 
                                                           
7 Al-Banna's holistic Islam is summarized in his message to his followers at the Fifth General 
Conference of Muslim Brotherhood, when he said: "for us [Muslim Brothers] Islam is both a belief 
(aquida), and worship ( ibada ); a homeland (watan), and a national identity (jinsiyya ), a religion (din), 
and a state ( dawla ), a holy book (mushaf), and a sword."   
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The group had strong positions on domestic and regional affairs, which led to 
confrontation with the political powers of that time, the palace and the government. 
Al-Banna, who became the first General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
established in 1940s an armed militia, known as "the Special Apparatus". The 
government dissolved the Brotherhood, confiscating its assets and arresting many 
members by 1948, the conformation culminated in Al-Banna's assassination in 1949.  
Under Nasser's regime, the government and the Brotherhood moved into open 
conflict. After a failed attempt at assassinating Nasser in 1954 for which the Muslim 
Brothers and its secret apparatus were accused, thousands of Muslim Brothers were 
arrested; others went into exile. The crackdown continued until after Nasser’s death in 
1970 (Shehata, 2012). The movement then went through a radicalized phase in the 
1950s and 1960s under the influence of Sayyed Qutub, whose ideas later influenced 
extremist movements, from Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group (al Gamaa al 
Islamiyya) in Egypt to al Qaeda. After a series of internal debates, the Brotherhood 
renounced violence as a method of political change. The turning point was marked by 
the 1969 publication of Preachers, Not Judges by Hassan al Hodeiby, the general 
guide of the movement. Hodeiby rejected takfir, the idea of declaring others as 
infidels, and rejected violence as a method of political change (Shehata, 2012). 
In the 1970s, a number of Islamist movements and radical Islamist cells 
emerged in Egypt as well as in other Arab countries. Under Sadat, although the 
Muslim Brotherhood was still not legal, it was permitted to operate on university 
campuses. Islamists swept student union elections between 1975 and 1979, until the 
government dissolved the student unions. Religious publications were significantly 
increased, and two newspapers associated with the Brotherhood began circulation in 
1976. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the Brotherhood managed to build a solid social 
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base through its services infrastructure (Osman, 2011). The Brotherhood developed a 
matrix of social services, including healthcare, food distribution centers, 
accommodation and services for the out-of–town students, welfare services, all of 
which helped them present themselves to a large number of the Egyptians as "the 
provider" (Osman, 2011). During the 1970s, in addition to Muslim Brothers, other 
Islamists group began to take ground. The Salalfi trend, whose followers are 
committed to ways of the Salaf – the early forefathers of Islam, witnessed a 
considerable expansion (Dorpmueller & Shehata, 2012). One of the largest Salafi 
movements in Egypt, the Salafi Da'wa (al- Da'wa Al-Salafyia), originated in 
Alexandria in the 1970s. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi were not 
involved in politics until 2011; they were only focused on Da'wa. Their work includes 
mosque lessons, lectures, in addition to charity work (Dorpmueller & Shehata, 2012). 
Salafi in Egypt have a large social base, particularly among the lower class and the 
lower-middle class, yet they do not have an organizational structure or a hierarchal 
movement like the Brotherhood (Dorpmueller & Shehata, 2012).   
Under Mubarak's 30-year rule, alongside with their social services, the 
Brotherhood began participating in the formal political process, including elections 
for parliament, professional syndicates or unions, student councils, and faculty 
associations. The Brotherhood repeatedly won the elections of the Doctors', the 
Engineers', the lawyers', and the pharmacists' Syndicates (Shehata, 2012). The 
Brotherhood used to run for the Parliamentary elections since the mid-1980s; they 
used to run under the cover of other parties or independents as they were outlawed. In 
2005, the Muslim Brotherhood took 88 seats in the People’s Assembly, the largest 
number that any opposition group had ever won; such a victory that was followed by 
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a crackdown on the group by imprisoning the deputy guide and other leaders 
(Shehata, 2012).   
Participating in the political process profoundly influenced the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement. It forced the group to develop and articulate its attitude 
toward critical issues including the rights and freedoms that are the focus of the thesis. 
The development of its attitude was clear in its electoral programs and public 
statements.  
In conclusion, in this brief presentation of the background factors, several 
differences should be underlined: (1) The army became a main player in the Egyptian 
politics since 1952. (2) Egypt went through different stages that resulted in dramatic 
political and social transformations, which led to a lack of a strong opposition 
movement, lack of a vibrant civil society, significantly increased religiosity and 
conservatism in the Egyptian society since the 1970s, and the rising of Islamists 
groups with a wide public support. (3) Egypt was the cradle of the Islamist movement, 
where the Muslim Brotherhood movement was founded along with other Islamist 
groups.  
Having presented the different background factors in both countries, it could 
be fairly concluded that the different social and political milieu in both countries 
resulted in different weights and outlooks of social and political actors, which in turn 
influenced the rules and mechanisms set for the constitution-making process as will 
be discussed in the next section.     
Rules and Mechanisms of Constitution-Making 
The management of the early days of the transitional processes in both 
countries, and the events that took place shortly after the fall of the old regimes laid 
down the rules for the unfolding of the whole transitional processes that would follow 
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including the constitution-making processes. The following section tackles the rules 
and mechanisms adopted to establish transitional governments and electoral 
administrations in both countries, which were central to forming the constituent 
assemblies and to the distribution of power at the assemblies. 
Establishing National Constituent Assembly in Tunisia 
When President Ben Ali fled the country on 14 January 2014, the 
Constitutional Court affirmed former Speaker of the Parliament (Chamber of 
Deputies), Fouad Mobazaa, as acting President under Article 57 of the 1959 
constitution on January 15, 2011 to counter the legal void (Zemni, p. 5, 2014). From 
that date till the resignation of the extant Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi in 
late February, political instability plagued the country due to the tension between the 
legal government at that time and the revolutionary legitimacy that oppositional 
groups were clinging to (Zemni, p. 5, 2014).  
Ghannouchi's first post-Ben Ali government made a gesture of trying to 
achieve national unity and reconciliation. The cabinet included figures from Ben Ali’s 
regime, senior leaders from the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), the former 
ruling party, as well as 11 leading opposition and civil society figures. It was only one 
day later when several opposition figures resigned from the government including 
three members of the Union Ge'ne´rale des Travailleurs Tunisiens or the Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT) and the opposition leader Mustafa Ben Jaafar due to 
pressure from the protesters who did not trust Ghannouchi’s government and regarded 
it as a continuation of Ben-Ali's regime (Zemni, 2014). Ghannouchi government's 
transitional plan was to hold Presidential elections within six months in accordance 
with Article 57 of the 1959 constitution. The transitional government, therefore, 
mandated a new Commission, named the Commission for Political Reform headed by 
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Yadh Ben Achour, a respected legal scholar in Tunisia, to reform the electoral system 
for the Presidential election. Had this plan been implemented, it would have resulted 
in the election of a president with full legislative and executive powers in the absence 
of an elected legislative council (Proctor & Moussa, 2012).  
A coalition of revolutionary and oppositional groups including the labor union 
and civil society members joined forces to create the Front of January 14th who 
opposed the government's transitional plan. All these political forces agreed that the 
six-month time frame was too short to organize fair elections and that the election of a 
new president would not guarantee any significant break with the former regime while 
remaining within the boundaries of the existing constitution and institutions (Murphy, 
2012). The front, therefore, demanded that the government dissolve the RCD, the two 
houses of the Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Advisors), in 
addition to holding the election for a Constituent Assembly within a year. As the 
pressure on the government was mounting, Ghannouchi gave in to some of the 
popular demands by resigning from the RCD, reshuffling the government and 
removing the RCD members, and agreeing to postpone the elections and dissolve the 
two chambers (Murphy, 2012).  
For the revolutionary opposition, the concessions made by the government 
were not far-reaching enough. Another coalition, named the National Council for the 
Protection of the Revolution (the NCPR), was established including the Front of 
January 14th, human rights organizations, the UGTT, the Islamists of Ennahdha as 
well as the Lawyers Bar Association, among other groups. The coalition's escalating 
pressure reinforced by continuous street protests in Tunis and other cities in Tunisia 
led the second cabinet and the Prime Minister to resign by the end of February 2011 
(Nouira, 2012). The interim President, Fouad Mobazaa, was obliged to suspend the 
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1959 constitution and issue decree-law no. 14 relative to the provisional organization 
of public authorities. This document replaced the 1959 constitution and would be in 
effect until the elected Assembly adopted a new one. The decree-law dissolved all the 
representative councils and organized the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers 
(Nouira, 2012). 
The third transitional government under the leadership of Prime Minister Beji 
Caid el Sebsi put Tunisia on the course toward elections for the National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA), the 218-member body that would draft the new constitution. 
Initially, the election was planned for July 2011 under the electoral law that existed at 
the time; however, it was eventually postponed by decree (dated June 8, 2011) until 
October 2011, allowing sufficient time for the new electoral authority to prepare for 
the elections and for revising the electoral law (McCurdy, 2011). The High 
Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and 
Democratic Transition (The High Commission) was established by a Presidential 
decree on 18 February 2011. It was mandated by Decree no. 6  to draw up a new 
electoral law, and to give opinions regarding the performance of the government. The 
150-members of the High Commission were a fusion of the Commission for Political 
Reform, established previously by Ghannouchi, and the opposition NCPR. The High 
Commission, also known as the Ben Achour Commission after its chair Yadh Ben 
Achour, drafted several decrees that provided the legal framework for the elections of 
the NCA. The High Commission also established the 16-member Instance Supérieure 
Indépendante pour les Élections (ISIE) to manage the NCA elections. The ISIE set a 
precedent in a country where the Ministry of Interior had had the sole authority to 
organize and supervise elections. Although the 150 members of the Ben Achour 
Commission, together with the ISIE members, were not elected, they derived their 
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legitimacy from their wide representation including representatives from 12 political 
parties, 18 civil society organizations, comprising trade unions, professional 
associations, and human rights non-governmental organizations, and prominent 
national figures (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2011; McCurdy, 
2011).  
NCA Electoral Law 
One of the major achievements of the High Commission was drafting the law 
organizing the election of the Constituent Assembly after only one month of its 
establishment. The process of making this law was equally important as much as the 
outcome itself. It is interesting to highlight that the main discussions and debates 
among the Commission members revealed the concern over the dominance of one 
political actor, specifically the Islamist formation of Ennahdha, the most organized 
political force after Ben Ali's regime (Bras, 2012; Gobe, 2012, as cited in Zemni, 
2014). The Commission opted for proportional representation electoral system8 with 
the intention of preventing one party from controlling the Constituent Assembly to 
ensure that the body would be representative of all political formations within the 
country. The members of the High Commission voted on three different sections of 
the law, reflecting the discussions within its workings, namely the electoral system, 
the issue of parity between male and female candidates, and the ineligibility of former 
RCD members; finally, they voted on the whole law (Zemni, 2014).  
The NCA electoral law was issued in April 2011; it received praise in 
particular for encouraging plurality and promoting inclusivity (National Democratic 
                                                           
8 The rationale underpinning all proportional representation (PR) systems is the conscious translation of 
a party’s share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the legislature. PR systems are a 
common choice in many new democracies, as they facilitate minority parties’ access to representation 
and fulfils the principle of inclusion. In many respects, the strongest arguments for PR derive from the 
way in which the system avoids the anomalous results of plurality/majority systems and is better able 
to produce a representative legislature (IDEA, 2010). 
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Institute, 2011; Nouira, 2012). It was a closed-list proportional representation system 
with the largest remainder method9. The distribution of seats was based on the 
principle of one (1) representative for every 60,000 residents, with the addition of one 
(1) or two (2) seats, for governorates with low populations, to ensure fairer 
representation for the country’s inner regions (National Democratic Institute, 2011). 
Nouira (2012) postulates that this electoral system allows electoral justice to be 
reconciled with greater representation for the candidates’ lists and at the same time 
prevents the strongest candidate from acquiring an absolute majority. It is also 
important to mark the endeavor in the law to achieve appropriate representation for 
women and young people within the NCA by requiring that half the list comprise 
women, who alternated on the list with male candidates in the 27 domestic 
constituencies and four (4) out-of-country constituencies, and that one (1) candidate 
on each list be under 30 years of age. According to a study conducted on the 
implications of applying the NCA electoral law, Traboulsy (2012) concludes, among 
other points, that (1) The electoral law led to quite diverse constituent assembly in 
terms of the ideological and the party distribution, since 18 party and coalitions lists 
managed to get seats, in addition to 9 independents-lists. (2) The closed-list 
proportional representations system did not encourage parties to build coalitions 
before the elections, but rather they confined themselves to building their own lists. 
(3) The electoral law prevented any party from gaining an absolute majority, which 
forced parties to build coalitions at the NCA. (4) The parity system did not lead to the 
                                                           
9 The largest remainder method is defined as the total valid vote divided by the number of seats to be 
filled in the electoral district. It is a principle for converting votes into seats in list PR systems. After 
parties and groupings have been allocated seats in an electoral district, some seats will be unfilled, and 
some votes remain for each party. The remaining seats are then awarded to parties and groupings in 
order of the number of left-over votes they possess. The largest remainder method tends to be more 
favorable to smaller parties (IDEA, 2010). 
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hoped-for representation10 as it did not guarantee putting women on top of the lists; 
the same for young candidates. (5) The largest remainder method allowed the smaller 
parties to gain more seats and representation at the Parliament.   
It is also worth noting the environment in which the election was held. Despite 
the attempts to design an inclusive electoral law and build a representative Constituent 
Assembly, there were feelings of marginalization of other groups that were not 
represented at the NCA and distrust of political elites and their ability to address the 
country’s pressing problems that Tunisians voiced, in addition to the strikes and 
demonstrations that were common throughout the transition period and the security 
concerns (National Democratic Institute, 2011). Moreover, the polarized debate about 
the role of religion in society dominated the discussion in Tunisia during the election 
of the NCA members and the constitution-writing process as well (El-Issawi, 2012; 
Nouira, 2012; Stepan, 2012). The election discourse was largely reduced to the 
question of Islam’s place in Tunisia’s future, and the debate around the suspicion of 
secularists that Ennahda government would impose a new form of authoritarianism, 
and transform Tunisia into a theocracy (Murphy, 2012), claims to which Ennahda 
responded by reiterating its commitment to pluralism, to democracy and to 
maintaining the established rights of women under the Personal Status Code (Murphy 
2012). It also reiterated commitments to this effect in its campaign manifesto 
(Ennahda 2011). Amid this atmosphere of distrust and in an attempt to reassure voters 
that whatever the outcome of the elections to the constituent assembly, the winners 
would not be able to abuse the mission for constitutional reform, the main parties, 
                                                           
10 The electoral law allowed about 30.8% representation of women, or 67 members, 41 of whom were 
from Ennahda. The actual outcome of the electoral law, however, did not produce the hoped-for parity, 
since most parties, with the notable exception of Ennahda, failed to place women first on the lists 
(Stepan, 2012, p. 102). 
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including Ennahda, agreed and signed a document11 in mid-September which 
affirmed that the assembly would be limited to a term of just one year (Zemni, 2014).    
The election of the NCA, comprising 217 representatives, was held in October 
2011, almost 9 months after the ousting of Ben Ali. The election was described as free 
and fair as per the report of a number of observers (National Democratic Institute, 
2011; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2011; The Carter Center, 
2011). With a turnout of around 70% of registered voters, only 27 party, independent, 
and coalition lists won seats in the NCA out of more than 80 lists. Although Ennahda 
did not win an absolute majority (50% + 1), the party emerged as the strongest 
political force in the country, receiving more votes than the next eight parties 
combined and gaining a simple majority of 41.7% (89 of 217 seats) in the NCA. 
According to the ISIE, Ennahdha had obtained the highest number of seats in the 
Constituent Assembly, with a total of 89 seats, while the liberal Congress of the 
Republic (CPR), led by Moncef Marzouki, received 29 seats, and Al Aridha Al 
Chaabia (Popular Petition) received 26 seats. Ettakatol received a total of 20 seats, 
and the center-left Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) received 16 seats (The Carter 
Center, 2011). Had Tunisia chosen a majoritarian or plurality voting system, Stepan 
(2012) estimated that Ennahda might have swept almost nine out of every ten seats, 
instead of the slightly more than four in ten that it was able to win under proportional 
representation (Stepan, 2012).  
To conclude this section, although the first stage of the Tunisian transition was 
characterized by political instability, ongoing tension between political actors, distrust 
                                                           
11A total of 11 of the 12 political parties represented on the High Commission signed a “Declaration on 
the Transitional Process” on Sept. 15, the only exception was the Congress of the Republic Party 
(CPR). Although not legally binding, this document aimed to establish a road map to define the 
operating rules of the NCA and to limit its mandate to no more than one year (Carter Center, 2012, p. 
16). 
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of the political elites, and concerns about security and the economic situation, it is 
worth noting the persistent attempts to prevent one actor, being the legal de-facto 
government at that time or a particular political party, from manipulating the 
transitional process. The following points should be considered while comparing the 
situation in Egypt in the following section: (1) the management of the early phase was 
not controlled from above; different political and social actors managed to put 
pressure to change the course of the transition by holding the NCA election first; (2) 
the High Commission that drafted the NCA electoral law and supervised the work of 
the government was representative of  most social, political actors and civil society; 
and (3) Being aware of the risks involved in having one political party dominating the 
NCA, the law was intentionally designed to prevent any candidate-list from gaining 
absolute majority and allowing more representation of women and youth.  
The following section examines the phase prior to the actual drafting of the 
constitution in Egypt.  
Early Phase of the Transition in Egypt 
The situation in Egypt was quite different. The Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces (SCAF) was handed over power when President Mubarak declared that he was 
stepping down on February 11, 2011. This was despite the fact that according to the 
1971 constitution--then still in effect- the Speaker of the People’s Assembly, or if the 
People’s Assembly had already dissolved, the president of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, should have taken over (Article 84). However, most actors and the people who 
felt that the army had supported them during the 18 days of the uprising welcomed the 
SCAF’s rise to power at that time, and therefore a popular chant in the streets was 
“The army and the people are one hand.”  
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The constitution-making process in Egypt went through different stages after 
Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. The first stage began with the Constitutional 
Declaration that the SCAF issued immediately after assuming power on February 13, 
2011. The Declaration dissolved the Parliament with its two chambers (the People's 
Assembly and Shura Assembly) and suspending the 1971 constitution, which were 
among the popular demands of the demonstrators throughout the 18 days of the 
uprising (Farouk, 2013). According to the Declaration, the SCAF would hold power 
for six (6) months or until the elections of the People’s Assembly (Lower Chamber), 
Shura Council (Upper Chamber), and Presidential election were held. The SCAF 
would also establish a committee to amend some of the articles of the 1971 
constitution and call for a popular referendum on the amendments. This declaration 
provoked criticism for its failure to specify a timeframe for holding the elections. It 
also marked the beginning of polarized debates among the political elites about the 
sequence of the transition events: whether elections or writing a new constitution 
should come first. Brown (2013) argued that these debates missed two important 
points about transition: there should have been a “broad agreement among elites on 
the rules of the transition, and a procedure that allowed people to express their will 
early without having all matters settled by backroom deals” (p. 46). 
The SCAF appointed a small committee of eight members to introduce 
amendments to the suspended 1971 constitution. The committee members included 
Tareq El-Bishry, an Egyptian public figure and an Islamist, who served as the chair of 
the committee; Sobhi Saleh, a lawyer and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood; three 
judges from the Supreme Constitutional Court; and three law professors. The 
committee was neither representative nor pluralistic. It was supposed to be a council 
of technocrats; nevertheless, there has never been a public declaration of the reason 
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for selecting these particular figures, including the appointment of an Islamist figure 
to the chair and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was not a public figure or 
a lawyer with a well-established reputation in the Egyptian society (Serôdio, 2013, pp. 
16–18). The committee was given ten (10) days and was mandated with the task of 
amending the articles in the 1971 constitution related to the regulations of the 
legislative and Presidential elections so as to ensure fair and democratic elections as 
stated in the decree law for establishing this committee. The suggested amendments 
put forward by the committee mapped the sequence of transitional process starting 
with the legislative elections first, followed by the presidential elections. Parallel to 
the Presidential elections, the elected Parliament with its two chambers would elect 
100 members to form a constituent assembly that would be assigned with that task of 
drafting a new constitution within six months.   
Tension arose among the political elites over the constitutional amendments, 
polarized Egyptian society. The strongest supporters of the constitutional amendments 
were the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafists, who 
claimed that approving these amendments was the fastest means of achieving stability 
and restoring civilian rule through democratic elections. The Islamists relied heavily 
on the religious discourse during their "yes" campaign. They presented to their base 
supporters the political conflict between Islamist and non-Islamist camps as if it were 
about the Islamic identity of Egypt, and the Second Article of the 1971 constitution, 
that is Sharia as the primary source of legislation, which was not among the articles 
that were amended to start with. They were even pushing for participating in the 
referendum and approving the amendments as a religious duty (Ahram Online, 2011, 
March 16) . The non-Islamist forces, on the other hand, were fiercely campaigning for 
a “No” vote on the referendum. They criticized the constitutional amendments for 
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lacking a reliable system of checks and balances, and for being ambiguous on various 
points, leaving too much space for a range of interpretations. Furthermore, the non-
Islamist forces were concerned about a rush to elections that did not afford 
opportunities for the newly emerged political movements. The amendments that the 
committee introduced were then put to a popular referendum on March 19, 2011 (i.e., 
about a month after Mubarak stepped down). With voter turnout of about 41%, 77.3% 
of the votes were for, and 22.7% were against the amendments to the provisional 
constitutional declaration. The Islamists celebrated the results of the referendum as a 
reflection of their weight, whereas the non-Islamists regarded the results as a mere 
reflection of the Egyptians’ desire to restore stability (Serôdio, 2013, pp. 16–18).  
The amendments12 that the vote declared them, along with other articles 
reintroduced from the 1971 constitution was issued as a Provisional Constitutional 
Declaration by the SCAF. The declaration comprised 63 articles: it had Article I and 
II from the 1971constitution, which are concerned with the identity of the country and 
Sharia as the main source of legislation, in addition to fundamental rights and 
freedoms articles and other articles that are concerned with the management of the 
transitional process including the authority of the SCAF to hold both the legislative 
and executive powers until the newly elected councils and the President assume 
power. The Declaration set the sequence of the transitional process, starting with the 
elections for the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council under the supervision of 
the judiciary. The elected members of the two councils would then have the task of 
electing, within six months, 100 members for the Constituent Assembly that would be 
in charge of drafting a new constitution. Presidential elections would follow the 
                                                           
12  Not all the approved amendments in the 19 March Referendum were included in the 
subsequent Declaration.   
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parliamentary elections, and a committee known as the High Committee for 
Presidential Elections, which had judges among its members, would form to organize 
and supervise the presidential elections. 
Establishing Constituent Assemblies 
The second stage of the constitution-making process was establishing the 
Constituent Assembly. It was not until September 2011 that the SCAF announced the 
schedule for the People's Assembly and the Shura Council elections, under pressure of 
continuous street demonstrations. The SCAF issued the electoral law stating that 
candidates within a party list system would contest two thirds of the seats on the 
People’s Assembly, while independents would contest the remaining one third. 
Conflicts erupted over the electoral law, with the non-Islamists claiming that the 
electoral law would allow the Islamists to dominate independent parliamentary seats 
and would not allow new parties to be represented (Serôdio, 2013). The Islamists, 
represented by the Muslim Brotherhood's party, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and 
the Salafist Al-Nour party together with other Islamist parties such as Al-Jama’a al- 
Islamiya, a former jihadist group who renounced violence, represented by the 
Construction and Development Party (CDP), won 70% of the seats in People’s 
Assembly13 and more than 85% of the seats on the Shura Council (Ragab, 2012).   
In accordance with the March Constitutional Declaration, the Islamist-led 
parliament would elect 100 members for the Constituent Assembly to draft the new 
constitution. The main issue of the debate regarding the criteria of establishing the 
assembly was Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration, which did not clearly state 
whether the People’s Assembly and Shura Council were to select members from 
                                                           
13 According to the official result published on Ahram Online (2012, Janaury, 22), the Islamists gained 
about 70% of the People’s Assembly: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party secured 
almost 43.7%; the Salafi Al-Nour Party came second and gained around 24%; and the more centrist 
Islamist party al-Wasat obtained 11 (3.7%).   
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within their own houses or from the electorate (Casper, 2013a). In addition, there was 
not any reference in the Constitutional Declaration to the criteria of electing the 
members of the Constituent Assembly, so it was for the Islamist-led Parliament with 
its two chambers to decide on the criteria. Accordingly, after long debates, the 
legislative body decided that 50% of the Constituent Assembly members (50 
members) would be from within the People's Assembly and Shura Council, and the 
rest from outside. On the day of electing the Constituent Assembly members, the FJP 
and the Al-Noor party presented a ready-made list of candidates for the Parliament 
members to elect from, an issue which was extremely provocative for the non-
Islamists and led to withdrawal of a number of them (Abd El-Maguid, 2012). 
Reflecting the majority in Parliament with its two chambers, the Constituent 
Assembly had an Islamist majority of 66 out of a total of 100 members and only 6 
women and 5 citizens of the Coptic religion (Abd El-Maguid, 2012). The Assembly 
was supposed to present a final draft within 6 months that would then be put to a 
popular referendum within 15 days of its submission. The non-Islamist forces 
objected the formation of the Constituent Assembly, and many from the liberal and 
leftist parties boycotted the Constituent Assembly, either by not showing up or by 
resigning after a few sessions. In addition, Al-Azhar withdrew, objecting due to its 
representation by only one member and the two representatives of the Egyptian 
Orthodox church withdrew due to the dominance of the Islamists and their weak 
representation, especially since the Egyptian Catholic and Anglican Churches were 
not represented to start with (Serôdio, 2013; Abd El-Maguid, 2012). The crisis of the 
members who withdrew, which clearly undermined the legitimacy of the Consistent 
Assembly, continued until the Assembly was dissolved when the Supreme 
Constitutional Court rendered it unconstitutional in April 2012, on the grounds of 
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Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration (Casper, 2013a; Abd El-Maguid, 2012). 
The rationale of the court’s decision was that the members of the two houses were 
entitled the authority to elect members to sit on the Constituent Assembly but not to 
elect themselves to the Constituent Assembly (Awad, 2014). 
The 2012 Constituent Assembly 
There were several attempts by a number of political figures and the SCAF to 
mediate between the Islamists and the non-Islamist political actors who had 
withdrawn from the first Constituent Assembly to reach a consensus on new 
mechanisms for establishing the next Constituent Assembly, which could guarantee 
the representation of all political parties and social groups. The formation of the 
constituent assembly, however, remained at a stalemate until June 5, 2012, when 
SCAF invited all political parties to meet and issued an ultimatum about completing 
the structure of membership. After rounds of negotiation, all political parties managed 
to reach a consensus on new criteria for establishing the constituent assembly based 
on the principle of parity between Islamists and non-Islamists and the rules of 
adopting the articles of the constitution, which would require a majority of 67% to 
pass an article, or 57% if the pervious percentage failed to be reached. Several 
Islamist and non-Islamist actors praised the agreement, and the FJP issued a statement 
that it was keen on putting Egypt’s interests above its own, reach a consensus, and 
resolve any disagreement (Ahram Online, 2012, June 7). Disagreements then arose 
over the implementation of the parity principle, since representatives of the state 
institutions, judiciary and Al-Azhar, and the churches in addition to Al-Wasat Islamist 
Party, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya Party's CDP were considered from the non-Islamists' 
share (Abdel-Maguid, 2012; Hamzawy, 2012). The Islamists, on the other hand, 
claimed that the assembly representing the Egyptian society and the Egyptian voters 
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would have the final say in the referendum, accusing the liberals and leftists of 
manipulation for political ends. In an interview with the Arab West Report (Serôdio, 
2013c), Amr Darrag, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood and chairman of 
the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the FJP, and Secretary-General of the 2012 
Constituent Assembly, stated that dividing members into the categories of Islamists 
and non-Islamists had undermined the work of the assembly. There was no absolute 
definition of an Islamist. He said that he “considers himself an Islamist, but also holds 
views many would categorize as liberal” (Serôdio, 2013c, p. 43).   
Amid this political crisis, the Islamist led-Parliament issued Law no. 79 on the 
composition of the second Constituent Assembly on June 11, 2012, which was quite 
general in terms of stating that “the Assembly’s composition shall represent—as 
much as possible—all sectors of the Egyptian society.” In light of these events, a 
number of members subsequently withdrew from the assembly at different points 
throughout the constitution-making process ended in an overwhelmingly Islamist-
majority assembly with 64 members out of the 85 in attendance (75%) Islamist, while 
the rest were independent (Casper, 2013b; Farouk, 2013). Of the 85 members, there 
was not a single representative of Egypt’s religious minorities, and there were only 
four women (Casper, 2013b). It is worth mentioning that both the Islamists and non-
Islamists admitted the inefficiency of the process. In the previously referred to 
interview, Darrag said that “the political fights between Islamists and non-Islamists 
have resulted in a constitution that was rushed in the last weeks it was functioning and 
a support base for the constitution that was much less than if parties would have 
worked towards a consensus” (Serôdio, 2013, p. 14). On the other hand, Wahid 
Abdel-Maguid, a political scientist and a non-Islamist politician, who had been the 
spokesperson for the constituent assembly before withdrawing in September 2012, 
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explained, as an eyewitness to all the events, in his book The 2012 Constitution 
Crisis…Documentation and Analysis (2013) that the constitution-making process had 
turned into a political battle among different actors since Mubarak’s ouster. Further, 
this political battle destroyed the hopes of producing a constitutional document that 
exhibited consensus and hence could be considered a social contract between the state 
and the people. 
Finally, the crisis of the constitution-making process in Egypt started with the 
SCAF’s Declaration in February 2011 that led to the non-transparent establishment of 
a non-representative committee to introduce amendments to the suspended 1971 
constitution, and then the March Constitutional Referendum, which was rushed and 
paved the way for the consolidation of the Islamist-majority dominance in the 
parliament with its two chambers. The deficiencies of the mechanisms that governed 
the constitution-making process, which did not ensure equal participation of all 
stakeholders, resulted in the political battle over the constitution from February 2011 
to December 2012, and shattered the hope for a compromise on the constitutional text 
(Farouk, 2013).  
To conclude, this chapter has brought evidence to the following: (1) there 
were a number of background factors, including the political and social milieu of both 
countries, which had directly or indirectly influenced the constitution-making process. 
In Tunisia, Bourguiba's modernization project laid down the foundation of a 
progressive and urban state with a high literacy rate and vibrant civil society, where 
religion ceased to exist in the public sphere, and religious institutions and education 
were monitored by the state. The Islamist movement in Tunisia represented by the 
Ennahda Islamist party committed itself to multi-party democracy and political 
pluralism and to the progressive rights that women were granted. It also forged ties 
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with the human rights league, the labor movement, and other opposition parties 
against the regime's repression regardless of the ideological differences. In Egypt, the 
situation was quite different. Egypt went through different stages that resulted in 
dramatic political and social transformations, which led to lack of a strong opposition 
movement, lack of a vibrant civil society, significantly increased religiosity and 
conservatism in the Egyptian society since the 1970s, and the rise of Islamists groups 
with wide public support. Egypt was the cradle of the Islamist movement, where the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups were founded. (2) The second 
independent variable is the measures and mechanisms of constitution-making. In 
Tunisia, the High Commission that drafted the NCA electoral law and supervised the 
work of the government was representative of most social, political actors and civil 
society, and the electoral law was intentionally designed to prevent any candidate-list 
from gaining absolute majority and allowing more representation of women and 
youth.  By contrast, the crisis of the constitution-making process in Egypt started with 
the SCAF’s Declaration in February 2011 that led to the non-transparent 
establishment of a non-representative committee to introduce amendments to the 
suspended 1971 constitution, and then the March Constitutional Referendum, which 
was rushed and paved the way for the consolidation of the Islamist-majority 
dominance in the parliament with its two chambers. The deficiencies of the 
mechanisms that governed the constitution-making process and the electoral law of 
the Constituent Assembly did not ensure the equal participation of all stakeholders. 
This chapter attempted at answer why Islamists in both countries gained different 
majorities. The following chapter will examine how these different majorities affected 
the process of constitution-making itself.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the constitution-making processes in Egypt and 
Tunisia. It examines how the independent variables that were discussed in the 
previous chapter affected the constitution-making process, the intermediate variable, 
which in turn influenced the constitutional outcome, the dependent variable. The 
chapter addresses the second question of the master's project: How did having a 
qualified majority of Islamists in Egypt as opposed to having a relative majority in 
Tunisia impact the process of constitution-making in each country? To answer this 
question, this chapter examines the proceedings of constitution-making process in 
both countries, the bylaws of the constituent assemblies and how they were enacted, 
and the role of the Islamists and other political and social actors in the process of the 
constitution-making.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to the 
constitution-making process in Tunisia. The bylaws of the constituent-assembly will 
be analyzed, in addition to the role of different political and social actors at the NCA, 
their initial position, and the final outcome. The second part addresses the 
constitution-making process in Egypt and the influence of the qualified majority of 
Islamists on the process of constitution-making.    
The Constitution-Making Process in Tunisia 
The National Constituent Assembly (NCA) Bylaws 
The elected NCA first met in November 2011; however, it was not until the 
end of January 2012 that the NCA adopted its rules of procedure, also known as the 
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Assembly's by-laws, or règlements (Proctor & Moussa, 2012). The elected NCA 
adopted by majority (141 members agreed, 37 voted against, and 39 abstained) the 
bylaws of the Assembly, also considered a provisional constitution, which suspended 
by default the March 2011 provisional constitution, organized the authority among the 
three offices, and set the laws governing the country during its transition (Proctor & 
Moussa, 2012). In addition to drafting a new constitution for the country, the 
Assembly possessed legislative authority and had the tasks of electing the NCA 
Speaker and the interim President, who would appoint the Prime Minister, the 
candidate of the party with the majority at the NCA (Text of the Bylaws, 2011). 
The Assembly received severe criticism for taking longer than expected to 
complete its rules of procedure, due to several internal tensions among the members. 
Developing a set of rules of procedures that could not be abused by the majority-
coalition was a difficult task, since "there is probably not a single set of rules of 
procedure in any parliamentary assembly in the world that is completely safe from 
abuse either by a minority or (a much greater risk) by a majority determined to exploit 
its preponderance of votes" (Proctor & Moussa, 2012, p.39). The situation in Tunisia 
was quite complicated, since the Assembly had a dual task and its bylaws served as 
the provisional constitution. According to a report that International IDEA issued in 
2012, the bylaws suffered from the major, broad weakness of ambiguity: “too much is 
left to chance, to unspoken rules and to informal interparty deals” (Proctor & Moussa, 
2012, p. 6). It did not, for instance, establish a timeline detailing the work of the NCA. 
Although all political parties represented in the High Commission, except for the 
Congress for the Republic (CPR), signed a non-binding declaration limiting the 
timeframe of the NCA activities to one year, the NCA bylaws made no mention of a 
timeframe (The Carter Center, 2012).  
62 
The NCA rules of procedure established three types of committees (rule 41): 
constitutional standing committees, legislative standing committees and special 
committees. Each committee is headed by a bureau composed of a chairman, a deputy 
chairman, a rapporteur, and two assistant rapporteurs (rules 49 and 50); the 
membership of these bureaus reflected the political composition of the NCA. Thus, 
the overwhelming majority of chairmanships or even all the members of the bureaus 
belonged to the majority ruling coalition (Proctor & Moussa, 2012, pp. 34-36). The 
task of drafting the new constitution was entrusted to six constitutional standing 
committees, each of which is charged with studying and then writing a draft for the 
articles that fall within its area of specialization (Zoglin, 2013). The president of the 
NCA and the chairs of the six drafting commissions formed a Joint Committee for 
Coordinating and Drafting (JCCD) that was responsible for reconciling the 
commission drafts. It is worth mentioning that Ennahda wanted one of its members to 
chair this commission due to its importance; however, the Ettakatol party, which 
belongs to the Troika coalition, insisted that the president of the NCA be the chair of 
this committee. Finally, the vote ended the debate for Ettakatol (Proctor & Moussa, 
2012, p. 33).  
The bylaws of the Assembly set forth the rules for the ratification process as 
follows: the full NCA must vote on individual articles and provisions; each article 
must be approved by absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) to pass; and a two-thirds 
majority or qualified majority would be required to approve the entire constitution. If 
that failed, the JCCD could offer revisions and re-submit the constitution to the NCA. 
If two-thirds of the NCA members did not vote in support of the constitution a second 
time, it would be submitted to the people for a national referendum (Zoglin, 2013). 
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To conclude this section, it should be underlined that the NCA was granted 
expansive powers, in addition to drafting a constitution; it was entrusted with the 
legislative power, and the authority to run the country throughout the phase of 
transition. The NCA had the authority to enact its own bylaws that became a 
provisional constitution for the country during the transition and its rules of 
procedures, in addition to fully-fledged parliamentary functions without any clear 
timeframe for the NCA to end its work (El-Sayed, 2014). The membership of all the 
assembly committees reflected the political composition of the NCA, with most of the 
chairpersons of particularly the six drafting constitutional committees belonging to the 
majority-coalition. Accordingly, the drafting of the constitution was based on political 
weight. However, the adoption procedures—two-thirds for the whole constitution or 
else to go to a public referendum—constrained the manufactured majority or the 
majority-coalition from manipulating the constitution-making process. The Open 
Democracy's report analyzing the constitution-making process in Tunisia mentioned 
that the effect of this voting rule was that no single party or political bloc could hope 
to unilaterally impose a constitution on the country as happened in Egypt, and forced 
them to find a compromise that would be acceptable to a large part of the assembly 
(Meyer-Resende & Weichselbaum, 2014).  
Political and Social Actors at the NCA 
The Troika Governing Coalition 
Although Ennahda came in first with 89 seats (41%), it was far from obtaining 
an outright majority (50 + 1) to rule. This was necessary for obtaining the needed 
majority and for avoiding the scenario of “a vote of no confidence that could lead to 
the accession of a new ruling majority in the NCA” (Stepan, 2012, p. 91). It is worth 
mentioning here, that unlike the Egyptian case, there were no Salafists or other 
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Islamists factions represented at the NCA. Accordingly, the Ennahda party, 
compromising ideological differences, formed a coalition with two secular parties: the 
Congress for the Republic (CPR), which won 29 seats, and the Democratic Forum for 
Labor and Liberties (Ettakatol), which won 20 seats. The three-party coalition 
together represented a majority of 139 seats, which was still less than a two-third 
majority of the NCA (El-Sayed, 2014). This coalition, also known as the Troika, was 
formed after long negotiations and after other party representatives in the Assembly 
refused to take part in Ennahda-led government (Stepan, 2012). The Troika coalition 
divided what is referred to as "the three presidencies" among themselves: the head of 
the CPR, Moncef Marzouki, was elected as the interim President of the Republic; the 
head of Ettakatol, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, was elected as the Speaker of the NCA; and 
the interim President assigned the position of Prime Minister to the Secretary-General 
of Ennahda, Hamadi Jebali. The coalition also formed the government, where 
Ennahda had a clear majority of positions (Feuer, 2012; Nouria, 2012). 
Within Ennahda itself, there was the challenge of achieving the balance 
between the religious voices constituting the core of its constituency and the demands 
of the secular parties in both the government coalition and the opposition (Brody-
Barre, 2012). In an interview, Larayedh, the chief of Ennahda’s political bureau, said 
that he considered the coalition a great success, and proof that Ennahda’s words about 
embracing democratic practices and promoting pluralism were not just empty 
promises (Brody-Barre, 2012). According to Larayedh, it was “the first party in the 
Arab world—Islamist or otherwise—to facilitate a transformation from ideological 
competition or antagonism to cooperation” (Brody-Barre, 2012, p. 217). On the other 
hand, other members of the opposition and disenchanted members of the CPR and 
Ettakatol criticized the coalition for being based on superficial and fragile linkages, 
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rather than ideological affinity (Brody-Barre, 2012). They regarded the coalition as 
largely inefficient due to internal divisions, and considered that the other two parties 
were losing their autonomy and risking their integrity by participating in the coalition 
(Brody-Barre, 2012, p. 217). 
The CPR is a secular party with a socialist-leaning approach. Human rights 
activist Moncef Marzouki founded the party in 2001, yet the party did not gain legal 
status until March 2011. It holds a human rights agenda, based on the sovereignty of 
the people and the dignity of the citizens (Gamha, 2011). It was not the first time for 
the CPR to form an alliance with Ennahda, since the two parties had established an 
opposition alliance together with the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), to 
challenge Ben-Ali's regime (Haugbølle & Cavatorta, 2011). Given its weight in the 
Assembly (29 seats) and its historical willingness to align with Ennahda, the CPR’s 
participation in the governing coalition and Marzouki’s post as president did not 
surprise observers (Brody-Barre, 2012, p. 218). However, after almost a year after the 
formation of the government, the CPR split into two camps: one supporting the 
party’s position in the government and one advocating a return to the party’s founding 
principles (Dami 2012, as cited in Brody-Barre, 2012). 
The third partner in the governing coalition is the Ettakatol party, which 
gained about 9% of the vote, giving it the fourth most seats in the Assembly. 
Mustapha Ben Jafaar established Ettakatol in 1994, but it did not gain legal status 
until 2002. The party represents the center-left and has emerged as the PDP’s main 
competitor. It ran for the first time in the 2011 elections, and its campaign emphasized 
its stances on transparency and gender equality. Yet, as with the CPR, being part of 
the governing coalition posed challenges for Ettakatol and threatened its inner 
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organization. Consequently, a number of high-ranking officials and members of the 
Constituent Assembly resigned in late 2011 and early 2012 (Brody-Barre, 2012). 
After roughly a year-and-a-half of rule under the Troika, many Tunisians were 
growing increasingly unhappy. The instability continued unabated and terrorist acts 
became increasingly frequent. Common accusations were that the Troika tended 
toward reproducing Ben Ali’s system of government and was attempting to 
monopolize power (Kerrou, 2014).   
The Opposition Coalition 
Tunisia’s political spectrum contained a range of diverse non-Islamist groups 
that occupied the majority of the seats in the NCA. They included dozens of fractured 
secularist, leftist, communist, and old regime parties that failed to overcome the 
tradition of mistrust, discord, and personal interests inherited from Ben Ali’s regime, 
and presented a united front against the Ennahda-led ruling coalition (Haugbølle & 
Cavatorta, 2011). The result of the NCA elections, which diminished the weight of 
each of these parties individually in relation to Ennahda, forced the leadership of the 
fragmented parties to attempt to form an opposition coalition (or coalitions) soon after 
the government took office (Samti, 2011; Bedoui, 2012; Ben Romdhane, 2012; 
Hnaien, 2012; Khalfoaoui, 2012, as cited in Brody-Barre, 2012). There were several 
attempts to initiate a coalition, such as Al-Massar (Social Democratic Path) and Al-
Jumhuri (Republican Party [PR]). These initiatives were attempts to gather the 
substantial opposition parties in the Constituent Assembly in one front. Other groups 
intended to form coalitions, even with parties that had not managed to secure 
representation in the NCA, in order to create a single united coalition for the next 
elections (Brody-Barre, 2012, p. 221). However, due to internal fighting and 
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ideological fragmentation, these initiatives failed to form a strong front to counter 
Ennahda-led coalition.  
In the aftermath of the assassination of prominent secular politician Chokri 
Belaid and opposition figure Mohamed Brahmi, there was an increasing 
dissatisfaction towards Ennahda-led coalition, and many Tunisians held them 
accountable for the increase in religiously-motivated violence in the country (Brody-
Barre, 2012). Former Prime Minister and veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi 
established the Nidaa Tounes party seizing the momentum of increasing anger against 
the Troika and lifting the hopes of many Tunisians about the possibility of 
coordinating secular groups under a unified coalition (Wolf, 2013). Nidaa Tounes 
managed to unite much of Tunisia’s opposition that was eager to counterbalance 
Ennahda. It attracted members representing a wide political spectrum, ranging from 
Tunisia’s non-Islamist left to the right (Wolf, 2013).  
The Salafists 
Although Salafists in Tunisia were not represented at the NCA, they 
influenced the constitution-making process in different ways. According to Alexander 
(2013b), the Tunisian Salafists are a diverse group. Among its members are militant 
Salafists, particularly Ansar Al-Sharia, which emerged as the principal militant group 
in Tunisia after Ben Ali’s ouster and was accused of the violent acts that took place 
during the transition, such as the attacks on art galleries, bars, and trade union offices, 
and the 2013 assassinations of the leftist opposition Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi. Such violent acts escalated the dissatisfaction of many Tunisians with the 
Ennahda-led government that they accused of taking lenient positions with respect to 
stopping the political violence. The rising fear of Islamist militancy also motivated the 
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secular parties and civil society organizations to join forces to counter this force 
(Wolf, 2013). 
Other Salafist groups in Tunisia are not jihadist and do not advocate violence. 
They support a state based on Islamic law, and they were thus at odds with Ennahda, 
which they accused of compromising Islamic values. Some of these Salafist groups 
have chosen to participate in the political process. A Salafist political party, Jabhat al 
Islah (The Reform Front), received legal status in March 2012, yet it was not 
represented in the NCA. Alexander (2013b) postulated that the Islamists in Tunisia 
cannot be easily categorized, as sometimes there is no clear dichotomy between the 
support base of the Salafists and that of Ennahda, which was more conservative than 
the leaders. The Salafists also influenced the internal politics of Ennahda and its Shura 
Council, which has to remain sensitive to Salafi interests to avoid losing support from 
the Salafists at the grassroots level (Alexander, 2013b). 
The Quartet 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Tunisia had robust civil society 
organizations and muscular labor unions, which had a historical role in the fight for 
independence and in the building of the modern state. Civil society organizations 
played an influential role in the Tunisian transition, serving as watchdogs supervising 
the work of the government and the NCA and facilitating national dialogue. It is 
worth mentioning that immediately after Ben Ali’s ouster in January 2011, the 
powerful Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) initiated a campaign to force then 
Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi to steer the transition in the right direction.   
Four of the most powerful civil society organizations in Tunisia, the Quartet, 
were key players in the constitution-making process: the powerful Tunisian General 
Labor Union (UGTT), together with the Tunisian employers’ union (UTICA: l’Union 
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tunisienne de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat), the bar association, and the 
Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH). The UGTT derives its strength from its 
history and organizational structure. It was founded in 1946 in the aftermath of WWII 
and joined forces with the national movement in the fight for independence. Since 
1956, when Tunisia attained independence, the UGTT has been a non-partisan body 
that was open to all professions. It unites all of the different segments of the society, 
and it has become a platform for the opposition to voice its opinions and demand its 
rights (Kerrou, 2014). The Tunisian employers’ union (UTICA) gave economic clout 
and weight to the Quartet. It was exceptional for the workers to join forces with the 
UGTT, which had not happened since independence (Chayes, 2014). In addition, the 
Tunisian Bar Association, the oldest member of the four institutions founded in 1887, 
which has been known historically for being an activist organization, joined forces 
with the LTDH, which is the first independent human rights association in the Arab 
world (Chayes, 2014). The weight and independence of these organizations, offering a 
relative advantage over most of their counterparts in other Arab countries, including 
Egypt, qualified them to counterbalance the Ennahda-led government and to play the 
decisive role in brokering Tunisia’s historic compromise and revived dialogue 
(Kerrou, 2014; Fakir, 2014). 
This alliance was an influential counterbalance to the Troika government that 
managed to revive the national dialogue and narrow the differences between the 
government, on the one hand, and the secular opposition represented by Nidaa Tounes 
and the Popular Front, on the other hand (Kerrou, 2014). Details of the Quartet's role 
will be discussed in the following section. 
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Challenges, Mediation and Breakthrough 
Throughout the process of constitution-making which took two years and four 
drafts to reach the final product, the NCA faced a number of key challenges and 
impediments that threatened the completion of the process itself. Many difficulties 
that emerged were linked to the context in which the constitutional process took place. 
The two-year long constitution-making process was marked by polarizing debates, 
mass street protests, two political assassinations, and rising terrorist acts (Mersch, 
2014). The first anniversary of the constituent assembly witnessed polarized political 
debates over the legitimacy of the constituent assembly itself, after the one-year 
mandate of the constituent assembly expired in October 2012 (Zaiter, 2013). For the 
opposition, the constituent assembly was no longer legitimate as it failed to meet its 
promise and to bring about real accomplishments. The opposition forces were asking 
for consensual legitimacy14, a broader agreement over the key issues within the road 
map of the transitional stage, and a more representative government (Zaiter, 2013). 
Ennahda and the Troika, one the other hand, were arguing that the NCA was the only 
legitimate authority, and its legitimacy could only end with adopting a new 
constitution (Aljazeera Net, September 2012). Their argument was that the year-long 
mandate that all the political parties including Ennahda signed was only a moral 
obligation and not a legal one (Zaiter, 2013).  
The assassination of Chokri Belaid on February, 6, 2013 was a turning point in 
the transition. Belaid was a secular influential politician, a lawyer and human rights 
activist, who was one of Tunisia's most prominent secular political figures opposed to 
                                                           
14  The idea of consensual legitimacy was central in the constitution-making processes in both Egypt 
and Tunisia. The non-Islamist oppositions were calling for consensual legitimacy, i.e. reaching 
consensus among most of the political and social actors on the divisive points, whereas Islamists were 
clinging to the electoral legitimacy.   
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Ennahda and an outspoken critic of the Troika government (BBC, 6 February 2013). 
The assassination triggered mass street protests against Ennahda and the government, 
and heightened rifts between Islamists and non-Islamists and the supporters and 
opponents of the regime (Zaiter, 2013). The demonstrations were directed against the 
government’s unwillingness to take action against the increasing political violence. 
Protestors were also giving vent to tension that was building up for months over the 
lack of progress in the transitional process; people were disenchanted with the 
constitutional process which should have been completed within a year, in addition to 
the Troika government's response to the country economic problems (Ghanmi, 2013). 
Even the cabinet reshuffling that came in response to mass protests following Belaid's 
assassination in February had failed to relieve that tension (Ghanmi, 2013). The 
second assassination of a key opposition figure of the NCA and a vocal critic of 
Ennahda, Mohamed Brahmi, spurred mass demonstrations when thousands took to the 
streets against Ennahda led-government (Legge, 2013). In the aftermath of this 
incident, polarization and mistrust reached their climax; the opposition boycotted the 
NCA and the President of the NCA declared the work of the NCA suspended till the 
opposition's return (Omri, 2014).  
Within the constituent assembly, the dividing lines of the discussion were 
mainly related to the relations between the state and religion and the question of 
Sharia, the issue of blasphemy, women's rights, and the distribution of executive 
power. The relation between the state and religion may have been the most divisive, 
generating highly charged debates within the NCA and among the public. The 
question of introducing a direct reference to Sharia in the constitution, which was 
raised by some of Ennahda members at the NCA, spurred a series of criticisms against 
Ennahda that was accused of adopting a “double discourse” or trying to impose Sharia 
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“through the back window,” especially since the party figures promised during the 
NCA election campaign that they would not attempt to include Sharia or enforce a 
particular way of life in the constitution (Marks, 2014, p. 20). Responding to this 
wave of anger and criticism, Ennahda postulated that from the beginning they were 
not interested in adding an explicit reference to Sharia; they did not want to divide the 
society at that fragile stage. Their understanding of Sharia is comprehensive 
(Shumuli), and there is nothing in the constitution that conflicts with Sharia (Ibrahim 
Zoghlemi, Ennahda Shura Council member, as cited in Marks, 2014, p.20). The same 
ideas were reiterated by Ghannouchi himself in an interview in summer 2011, when 
he said that Islam is a philosophy not rules (Marks, 2014, p.21). Ennahda left out 
adding an explicit reference to Sharia in the constitution, as an attempt to compromise 
on the role of religion. The preamble cites the “attachment of our [Tunisian] people to 
the teachings of Islam," and Article 6 states that the State protects "religion and the 
sacred".   
The relation between religion and state remained, however, as a divisive issue 
at the NCA. A conflict took place between two NCA members, Mongi Rahoui from 
the same leftist party as the Late Chokri Belaid, and Habib Ellour an Ennhda member, 
over Article 1, which reads as follows: “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign 
state. Islam is its religion, Arabic its language and the republic its system.” The two 
disagreed over whether the "it" in "Islam is its religion" referred to the state or the 
people, with Ellouz claiming "it" meant the state, while Rahoui said the people (Omri, 
2014). This dispute led to a deadlock over the wording of Islam's place in the 
constitution, until a compromise was found when the NCA reconvened after the 
Quartet's mediation. In the final draft Article 1 was left the same; however, after 
contentious debates Article 6 was modified and a clause was added to prevent takfir 
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(calling some unbeliever) after Rahoui received death threats because he was referred 
to by a Ellouz as unbeliever (Omari, 2014). The issue of blasphemy was another 
challenge when it came to religion matters. Ennahda introduced language that would 
criminalize blasphemy in Article 3 of the first constitutional draft, which stated that 
“the state guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice and criminalizes all 
attacks on that which is sacred,” "specifically defining the three Abrahamic faiths 
(Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) as faiths that would be protected from blasphemous 
attacks" (Marks, 2014, p. 24). It was only after significant lobbying on the part of 
local civil society groups, international NGOs, and foreign governments that Ennahda 
removed this language, which was regarded as a serious threat to the right of freedom 
of expression. As a compromise, a new phrase was added to Article 6 in the final 
constitution stating that "the State protects sanctities and prevents attacks on them" 
(Marks, 2014).   
 Another dividing point was protecting women's rights and the issue of gender 
equality. Although during its 2011 elections campaign Ennahda attempted to build 
confidence in its handling of women’s rights, in less than a year Ennahda members 
added language to the second constitutional draft in Article 28 which stated that 
"women are men's complements." The argument of the Ennahda representatives on 
the Rights and Liberties Committee was that men’s and women’s roles are indeed 
equal, but that they have different biological roles and obligations, and therefore men 
and women “complement” one another within the family (Marks, 2014, p. 23). This 
Article provoked a firestorm of criticism from local and international media; it was 
vehemently opposed by, among others, active and powerful Tunisian women 
coalitions and civil society organizations (Omri, 2014). The final constitution, thanks 
to the lobbying of women's rights activists and civil society organizations, has Article 
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20, which explicitly declares male and female citizens to be “equal in rights and 
duties,” and article 45, which states that "the government not only protects women’s 
rights, but supports their achievements and guarantees the equality of opportunities" 
(Mersch, 2014). The Articles on women's rights are discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
Other two problematic points were the independence of the judiciary and the 
parliamentary versus the presidential model. The dispute over the independence of the 
judiciary (Articles 102-124) was long and arduous, and it was not resolved until the 
very last debate of the articles in the constitution (Omri, 2014). Ennahda insisted on 
some sort of control or oversight by the executive over the judiciary but in the end it 
lost the battle. The appointment of judges in the new constitution is the "exclusive" 
right of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is legally and financially independent 
(Omri, 2014).  
The model of the new political system was another point of dispute. Ennahda 
strongly favored a parliamentary system after its victory in the 2011 elections. Its 
argument was that it is important to get rid of Tunisia’s tendency toward presidential 
authoritarianism, and to have a new political landscape where all voices are 
represented (Marks, 2014, p. 26). Ennahda accused the parties who wanted a 
presidential or semi-presidential model of abusing the constitution for their own 
interests because they do not have strong structured parties, while the opposition 
parties accused Ennahda of being self-serving and power hungry (Marks, 2014). After 
long debates and as an attempt at overcoming the deadlock, Ennahda ultimately 
compromised a great deal of ground on the future political system, moving from a 
parliamentary position, to a mixed system with a weak executive, and finally going 
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back to a stronger presidential position, which was a crucial political compromise 
(Marks, 2014, p. 24).   
When Ennahda-led coalition unveiled a draft constitution in June 2013, the 
opposition massively rejected it. The latter accused the Troika-led governing coalition 
of manipulating the whole process of constitution-making, and abusing its majority in 
the Coordination and Drafting Committee by imposing its views and modifying 
several key points agreed upon in the NCA six constituent commissions (Abdesselem, 
2014): "Compromise language we had hammered out, that Ennahda had agreed to 
verbally, disappeared from the draft […] It is the Troika's constitution," said one 
Constituent Assembly member Noomane Fehri, of the opposition Afek Tounes party 
(as cited in Chayes, 2014). According to Abdesselem (2014), the modifications in 
question were on (1) the preamble, where changes were made to include Islam in the 
institutional order of the State; (2) restrictions were placed on the right to strike; (3) 
establishing a strict parliamentary regime with a President that was partially deprived 
of all authority; and (4) the judiciary, whose independence was compromised. Under 
pressure from the opposition, a committee of consensus (CC) with responsibility to 
identify the contentious issues and lead negotiations was established just before the 
suspension of the work of the NCA upon the assassination of Brahmi. This 
committee, however, played a significant role following the reconvening of the NCA.  
The whole transition process came to a deadlock in July 2013 in the aftermath of the 
second political assassination. The NCA suspended its work, protestors took to the 
streets, and the opposition demanded the government’s resignation and the dissolution 
of the National Constituent Assembly (Frazer, 2014). The response of the ruling 
majority was the mobilization of their supporters and establishing a front defending 
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their legitimacy, which considered dissolution of the government and NCA to be “red 
lines” which were non-negotiable (Redissi, 2014).  
In a context charged with tensions, the UGTT created the quartet of civil 
society organizations to facilitate a National Dialogue. The National Dialogue would 
not replace the NCA; rather, its aim was to bridge the gap between the electoral 
legitimacy to which the government clung and the consensus legitimacy for which the 
opposition asked. It took two months for the Quartet to move the situation from a 
point of total deadlock in the summer of 2013 to reach an agreement on The Road 
Map (Redissi, 2014).  
The Quartet led negotiations resulting in the establishment of the National 
Dialogue in October 2013. Under the supervision of the Quartet, the National 
Dialogue drew up a roadmap for three tracks on which the leaders of the Ennahda-led 
government and the opposition agreed: the constitution, the government, and the 
electoral system. The National Dialogue included 21 parties on the basis of one 
representative member from each party, whatever its electoral share. The Dialogue 
put in place a road map that had three tracks: governmental, constitutional, and 
electoral, with internal committees created for this end. The Dialogue's job was not 
easy; it stopped more than once due to disagreements among the members. After three 
months of marathon negotiations, a breakthrough was reached by January 2014. The 
Ennahda-led government resigned and a technocrat, Mehdi Jomaa, was appointed 
(Redessi, 2014). The Constituent Assembly reconvened, and, with the National 
Dialogue working in parallel, the Consensus committee resumed its work and -as 
explained above- succeeded in resolving the constitutional differences of the 
contentious points in the text such as the place of religion in political life, the issue of 
takfir, the model of the new political system, the appointment process of judges, and 
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the age requirements to run for presidency. The NCA completed the constitution in 
another month, and on January 26, 2014, the NCA overwhelmingly approved the 149-
article Tunisian constitution with a total of 200 NCA members voted in favor of the 
final text, with 12 members voting against and only four abstentions (Chayes, 2014). 
Reaching consensus appeared to be the only option in an environment of extreme 
political polarization and political violence, and the only way-out for the Islamists to 
avoid submitting the constitution for a national referendum, in which the chances 
were that the Ennahda-led coalition would lose. It is worth mentioning that the 
Dialogue resumed its work to help complete the implementation of the road map, 
settle new differences, and support the unelected caretaker government till the 
parliamentary election (Redessi, 2014). Finally, the Quartet’s mediation saved the 
transition and the constitution-making process in Tunisia, and prevented the 
breakdown of the process. 
Having shed light on the constitution-making process in Tunisia, the following 
section examines how the qualified majority of Islamists in Egypt shaped the 
constitution-making process.     
The Constitution-Making Process in Egypt 
As discussed in Chapter 2, establishing the constituent assembly was an 
integral part of the process of constitution-making in Egypt. Unlike Tunisia, the 
power struggle between the different actors had started before the actual process of 
drafting the constitution due to the lack of precise measures of electing the constituent 
assembly members. This section examines the role of the political and social actors at 
the Constituent Assembly, and the impact of the qualified majority of Islamists 
manipulated on the constitution-making process.    
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Political and Social Actors at the Constituent Assembly 
  The SCAF 
The SCAF was one of the main forces in the constitution-making process, and 
its involvement in its different stages assumed different forms, as explained in the 
previous chapter. The SCAF represented what Elster (1995) referred to as an 
“upstream constraint” to the constitution-making process, that is, a constraint imposed 
by the person or institution that has the power to convene a constituent assembly or 
put the mechanism for establishing it (p. 373). Although the SCAF's management of 
the transition process was one of the main reasons that resulted in a non-
representative Constituent Assembly, the SCAF attempted at tipping a balance against 
the Islamist's power at different stages of the transition. The role of the SCAF in 
transition deserves further examination, yet it is beyond the scope of the project.     
The Islamists  
The Islamists are not a homogenous group; indeed, there are wide variations 
among the political Islamic groups or Islamists. They are diverse in their political 
agendas and goals, and their positions have evolved over time due to their political 
realities (Folkeson, 2012). The Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies 
(2012) mapped the Islamic political actors in Egypt, categorizing them into the 
following broadly defined groups: (1) the Muslim Brotherhood and their political 
party Freedom and Justice (FJP); (2) Conservative Islamic Salafi groups, represented 
by various political parties that were established during the transition, chief among 
them Al-Nour Party, which came out of the Salafi Da'wa in Alexandria--the 
mainstream Salafi movement in Egypt--in addition to other smaller groups that differ 
from Al-Nour in their positions, such as Al-Asla (authenticity), Al-Watan, and Al-
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Fadila (the virtue); (3) The Al-Wasat Party (Central party), founded by ex-Muslim 
Brotherhood member Abu-Ela Madi; and (4) Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic 
Group), a former jihadist group that renounced violence, and its political party, the 
Building and Development Party (Shehata & Dorpmueller, 2011; Ragab, 2012). All 
these Islamist groups had representation in the Parliament with its two houses (the 
People's Assembly and the Shura Council), and hence in the Constituent Assembly, 
yet the major representation was for the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP and Al-Nour 
Party that won 65% of the seats (Ragab, 2012).  
The rivalry between these Islamist groups, due to their different positions on 
the question of Sharia law and women’s and minorities’ rights among other issues, 
was another challenge to the constitution-making process. The Salafists accused the 
Brotherhood of being too compromising, while the Muslim Brotherhood, in turn, 
viewed the Salafists’ positions as naive and overly rigid (Al Anani, 2013). However, 
not all Salafists had the same position; Al-Nour Party demonstrated pragmatism 
occasionally, with its platform calling for establishing a “modern state that respects 
citizenship and coexistence between all people” (Al Anani, 2013). The Muslim 
Brotherhood accused the Salafists of widening the divide between the Islamists and 
non-Islamists or the liberal members. In an interview, Gehad el-Haddad, a FJP 
member, said “Salafists have in fact been the prime antagonists in passing many of 
the clauses by insisting on adding their own attachments to the texts […] The more 
they get their way, the more we lose liberal support” (Giglio, 2012).  
Non-Islamist Political Parties 
After the ousting of Mubarak, dozens of non-Islamists parties emerged, 
representing a wide range of ideologies, including socialism, liberalism, and 
nationalism (El-Azabawi & Hassan, 2013). This section only sheds light on the parties 
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which managed to get seats at the People's Assembly and those who played a 
prominent role during the constitution-making process. One of the most prominent 
liberal parties that emerged in the post-revolution era was the Free Egyptians Party or 
the Liberal Egyptian Party (Almasreyeen Alahrra). Although it was established in 
2011, it secured 14 seats of the party lists and a single individual seat. The party 
advocates liberal economic policies, freedoms, and citizenship rights. Its agenda 
advocates for separating religion-related affairs and state affairs (Almasreyeen 
Alahrra, 2014). 
 Another liberal party was the Neo-Wafd Party, which was historically 
established by Saad Zaghloul in the 1920s and then reestablished in 1978 under the 
name Neo-Wafd (El-Azabawi & Hassan, 2013). Despite being one of the oldest 
political parties in Egypt, it managed only to secure 7% of the seats at the People's 
Assembly. The Egyptian Social Democratic Party, founded in July 2011, secured 15 
seats. It represents a new stream in the Egyptian political sphere, advocating 
democracy, citizenship and human rights within the framework of a regulated capital 
market (Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 2014). Another newly founded liberal 
party is Al-Dostour Party, founded by Mohamed ElBaradei in April 2012 after the 
parliamentary elections, which was an attempt at uniting the opposition as well as a 
number of young people who considered ElBaradei as the icon of the revolution 
(Morsy, 2014). In addition, there are multiple leftist parties, the long-standing Al-
Tagammu (National Progressive Unionist Party), the Egyptian Socialist Party, and the 
Socialist Popular Alliance Party. There are also the Arab Nasserite parties and the 
recently formed Egyptian Popular Current Movement, founded by 2014 presidential 
candidate Hamdeen Sbahi (El-Azabawi & Hassan, 2013). There is also the Congress 
Party founded by the 2012 Presidential candidate and the former General Secretariat 
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of the League of Arab, Amr Moussa, in addition to the Egyptian National Movement 
party, founded by the 2012 Presidential runner, Ahmed Shafiq (Morsy, 2014).       
These political parties were known for chronic weakness and fragmentation, 
which was inherited from the successive authoritarian regimes since 1952. Major 
problems that these parties suffer from, among others, are the lack of funds, solid 
structural organization, and experienced leadership (El-Azabawi & Hassan, 2013). 
Most of these parties formed alliances and coalitions to run for the 2011/2012 
Parliamentary elections. The New Liberal parties, the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), in addition to Tagammu formed the Egyptian Bloc, 
which was supposed to counter the Muslim Brotherhood-led Democratic Coalition. 
However, they only obtained 33 seats (8.9%) of the People's Assembly, and only 
4.4% in the Shura council (Serodio, 2013). The Wafd Party ran on its own lists and 
secured 38 seats (9.2%), and at the end came the alliance of the leftist parties or the 
Revolution Continues Alliance (RCA) including the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, 
and Egyptian Current Party, in addition to members of the Revolutionary Youth 
Coalition, and the Egyptian Socialist Party, which secured only 1.57% of the seats 
(Serodio, 2013). All in all, the non-Islamist alliances and coalitions gained only 23% 
of the seats in the 2012 Parliament including the few seats that were regarded as the 
remnants of Mubarak's regime (Morsy, 2014). These coalitions did not last long after 
the parliamentary elections, and they were fragmented. The poor representation of 
non-Islamists in People's Assembly and the Shura Council was also mirrored in the 
composition of the first and second Constituent Assemblies that the Parliament 
elected as explained in the previous chapter. There were several unsuccessful attempts 
from the non-Islamist opposition to form a united front to counter-balance the 
Islamists (Morsy, 2014). It was only after President Morsi issued a constitutional 
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declaration in November 2012 giving himself far-reaching powers that the country's 
fractious and divided opposition from the liberal to the left united under the National 
Salvation Front led by the famous opposition figures Mohammed ElBaradei, 
Hamdeen Sbahi, and Amr Moussa (BBC, December 10, 2012). The coalition formed 
only a month before the Constituent Assembly submitted the draft constitution to a 
public referendum. The coalition did not manage to influence that constitution-
making process or to mobilize the vote against the constitution, but it played a 
significant role afterwards, until the removal of President Morsi (Morsy, 2014).  
Points of Divergence and Failed Consensus  
As explained in the previous chapter, even before the actual start of the work 
of the second constituent assembly, five non-Islamist parliamentary members, 
including representatives of the three parties of the Egyptian Bloc, in addition to the 
Socialist Popular Alliance and the Karama Nasserite party, which was part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led Democratic Coalition, declined their membership in the 
assembly in the light of what they described as “the Islamist monopoly on the 
constitutional-drafting process” (Serodio, 2013, p. 37). Other non-Islamists, however, 
were persistent on being represented in attempt to weigh in and impact the discussion 
and hopefully the final product of the assembly. Political scientist and secularist 
Wahid Abdel Maguid was even designated as a spokesperson (Awad, 2014 & Abdel 
Maguid, 2013).  
According to the March Constitutional Declaration, the Constituent Assembly 
had six months to finish its job. The assembly started by mid-June 2012, with the 
beginning of the Muslim brotherhood President's term, by enacting its own bylaws 
including the procedures of adopting the constitution individual articles, which 
required the consensus of all 100 members. Failure to reach a consensus would 
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indicate the need for an amendment, and the article would need the approval of 67 
members. If the article again failed to pass, 57 members would need to approve after 
further amendments (International Commission of Jurists [ICJ], 2012). The bylaws 
also divided the work of the Assembly into five committees, one for each chapter: the 
State and Essential Foundations of the Egyptian Society; Rights, Freedoms and Public 
Duties; the System of Governance and Public Authorities; the Independent and 
Supervisory Apparatuses; and Proposals, Dialogues and Societal Communication 
Committee, which was supposed to communicate with the civil society organizations, 
hold hearing sessions and receive people's suggestions. This latter committee was 
chaired by the Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed ElBeltagi, who also 
supervised and controlled the Assembly website. There was also a technical editing 
committee for the final editing and reviewing of the document (Youm Saba', 23 June 
2012).  
In an environment of extreme political polarization, full of internal divisions 
and ideological disagreements among the members, the Assembly started its work. 
Abdel-Maguid, the resigned spokesperson of the Assembly, detailed, in his book The 
Crisis of the 2012 Constitution (2013), the different attempts he and other non-
Islamist members undertook to reach consensus with the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafists over the points of disagreements which were mainly related to the religion's 
role in the state's affairs, women's rights, civil and political rights, economic and 
social rights, and the powers of the president and the political system. Abdel Maguid 
(2013) concluded it was only after three months from the beginning of the Assembly's 
work that the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood over the constitution-making 
process became evident, and it became clear that the Islamists were maneuvering and 
that they were not willing to compromise. 
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One of the central points of divergence was Article 2 about the status of Sharia 
in the constitution, while most of the political factions agreed to leave Article 2 as it 
was in the 1971 constitution, that is the principles of Sharia were the principal source 
of legislation. The Salafists were pushing for omitting the word principles to make it 
more general and to open the door for various interpretations and hence legislations 
(Abdel-Maguid, 2013). In addition, there were several attempts by Salafists supported 
by the Muslim Brotherhood to prohibit issuing any legislation that is not compatible 
with the Sharia, in addition to change the article stipulating that sovereignty is for the 
people to sovereignty belongs only to God (Abdel-Maguid, 2013). Such suggestions 
were met with uproar from the non-Islamist fractions accusing the Islamists of 
attempting to found a theocratic state. After lengthy negotiations, the Salafists finally 
agreed on leaving Article 2 as it was in 1971, yet they insisted on introducing a new 
Article 219 which defined the principles of Sharia as "including the general evidence, 
foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni 
doctrines and by the larger community." This definition transgressed the established 
interpretation by the Constitutional Court, the body that was exclusively entrusted 
with interpreting the principle of Islamic Sharia, which ruled before that the principles 
of Sharia are those provisions that contribute to the realization of its objectives: the 
protection of religion, life, reason, honor and property (SCC 2004, Awad, 2014). A 
number of non-Islamist members withdrew from the Assembly in the light of 
introducing this article arguing that this Article constituted a real threat to personal 
freedoms in Egypt and put in place the foundation of a religious state. (Ahram Online, 
2012).  
Another controversial point was the role of Al-Azhar, the most renowned 
religious institute in Egypt and the Islamic world. There were attempts at making Al-
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Azhar the reference for the affairs related to Sharia-law, that is, making Al-Azhar the 
reference of the law-making process in Egypt. Amid the strong disagreements of the 
non-Islamists members and the representatives of Al-Azhar themselves, the Article 
was amended to give Al-Azhar's advisory role: "Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be 
consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law" (Abdel-Maguid, 2013). Although the 
Al-Azhar's opinion was not binding, the non-Islamists forces considered that such an 
article placed state institutions under the authority of a religious one (Awad, 2014). 
Other points of disagreements were women's rights, and equality and non-
discrimination.  
According to Abdel-Maguid (2013), all the non-Islamist's attempts to 
introduce articles that guarantee women's rights and protect women against 
discrimination and violence were in vain. The Salafists would not consider women's 
rights as a point on the negotiation's agenda to start with, and the constitution was 
produced without a single Article on women's rights, as will be explained in the 
following chapter. In addition, the Islamists refused to incorporate any article 
prohibiting human trafficking or child marriage (Abdel-Magued, 2013, & Awad, 
2014). As for non-discrimination, the reference to the grounds of discrimination on 
the basis of sex, origin, language, religion or belief, which was the principal guarantee 
of non-discrimination in the constitution and which had been figured in all previous 
Egyptian constitutions, were removed and the non-discrimination article only stated 
that "all citizens are equal in rights and obligations, with no discrimination between 
them” (Awad, 2014, & Abdel-Maguid, 2013). Islamists also refused to integrate the 
non-Islamists' proposals of prohibiting imprisonment for crimes related to the exercise 
of freedom of the press, and also did not prohibit the suspension, closure, or seizure of 
any media outlet or a newspaper without a court rule (Awad, 2014, & Abdel-Maguid, 
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2013). Finally, the Islamists refused to make any reference to Egypt’s commitment to 
international treaties to which it is party, arguing that this might open the door for 
foreign intervention in Egypt's internal affairs, and also due to concerns that some of 
the treaties might contradict the principles of Sharia (El-Shobaki, 2014, & Abdel-
Maguid, 2013). 
The work of the Assembly became chaotic while attempting to hasten the 
process; draft contradictory texts were published on the Assembly website that was 
managed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The substantive committees accused the 
drafting committee of interfering in their job and leaking texts, particularly the Rights 
and Freedoms and the State and Society chapters, which were not endorsed by the 
former (Abdel Maguid, 2013 & Awad, 2014). The attempts at reaching a consensual 
document reached an impasse by November 2012, and a wave of withdrawals began 
on November 17, 2012 with the Church representatives. This was followed by the 
withdrawal of more than 30 non-Islamist members accusing representatives of 
Islamist forces of pushing towards a constitution for an Islamist state rather than for a 
national-unity state (Ahram Online, 2012). In a press conference at the Wafd Party, on 
18 of November, the withdrawers announced that they had lost any hope that the draft 
constitution would gain consensus from all political forces or reflect Egypt’s 
aspirations for building a functioning civilian democracy, and that they had reached a 
dead end without consultations coming to any conclusion (Ahram Online, 2012). 
They accused the Islamist forces and the chairman of the assembly of speeding up the 
process of finalizing the draft constitution without enough or serious debate of the 
controversial articles. Among the withdrawals were also the ten members of the 
Assembly’s consultative/advisory committee including constitutional law expert 
Ahmed Kamal Abul-Magd; political analyst Hassan Nafaa; and Nasserite activist 
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Hamdi Qandil, who wrote to the Islamist-oriented chairman saying that they tried to 
offer various suggestions but "it is regrettable that they fell on deaf ears" (Ahram 
Online, 2012). At that point seeking consensus was not on the agenda; and instead of 
seeking reconciliation, the withdrawn representatives were quickly replaced by 
substitute members (El-Sayed, 2014).  
In an attempt to fight back, the Islamists accused the opposition of being a 
minority that was trying to impose its positions and while disrespecting the will of the 
Egyptians, who had elected the former. In his Arab West Report (2013) interview, 
Amr Al-Derrag said, “When the non-Islamists realized that the success of the 
Constituent Assembly and the passing of the constitution would lead to parliamentary 
elections within the two months following its approval, they did all they could to 
delegitimize the new constitution in the eyes of the people […] People who withdrew 
were doing something completely against democracy: they wanted to impose their 
opinion as a minority” (Serodio, 2013, p. 51). Other members of the Constituent 
Assembly, including Mohammed Mahossoib, a member of Al-Wasat Party, Nadia 
Mustpha, independent Islamist, and Ahmed Talaat, counselor at the Supreme Court, 
voiced the same opinion in interviews for Arab West Report (Serodio, 2013a, 2013b). 
They said that Islamists could not be blamed for the poor electoral performance and 
the lack of organization of the liberals and leftists, who were now violating basic 
democratic premises, such as the importance of respecting elections and the will of 
the majority (pp. 37, 51, 64). The Assembly’s chairman, Hossam El-Ghiryani, told 
members “they should not be bothered by the flurry of withdrawals … it is rather 
better to go forward completing our job until the end without listening to all the fuss 
about withdrawal” (Ahram Online, 2012). Younis Makhyoun, a Salafist and currently 
the chair of Al-Nour party, told Al-Ahram Online that "the liberal forces wanted 
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enshrine their secular agenda and non-religious views in Egypt’s constitution…Egypt 
is a predominantly Muslim country and its constitution should stress this fact” (Ahram 
Online, 2012).  
Shortly after this wave of withdrawals, on November 22, 2012, President 
Morsi issued a constitutional declaration in which he gave himself far-reaching 
powers and extended the Constituent Assembly's work for a maximum of eight 
months. The constituent assembly did not benefit from the extension of its mandate, 
and on November 29, it held a marathon 18-hour session, discussing provisions with 
which it had never dealt before, and ended up adopting the draft constitution (Awad, 
2014). The wrong start in the formation of the Constituent Assembly led to a 
defective constitution that did not attain a consensus amongst the country's political 
forces, and deepened the polarization of the society despite the fact that the 
constitution received a comfortable majority of 63% of the voters (el-Shobaki, 2014).    
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated how the different Islamist 
majorities impacted the constitution-making process. In Tunisia, Ennahda Islamists, 
who only gained a simple majority at the constituent assembly, were forced to form a 
coalition with other two secular parties to have the right to form a government. The 
ruling coalition, the Troika, although it had an absolute majority, still did not have a 
two-thirds majority that would have enabled it to pass a constitution alone. 
Accordingly, reaching consensus appeared to be the only option to avoid submitting 
the constitution for a national referendum, in which the chances were that the 
Ennahda-led coalition would lose in an environment full of political polarization and 
political violence for which the Troika were blamed. In Tunisia, when the process had 
reached an impasse and the opposition withdrew, the assembly suspended its work, 
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and there was a powerful nonpartisan civil society that was capable of playing the role 
of mediator and brokering a breakthrough.  
The situation in Egypt was quite different. Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the Salafists had a qualified majority for the reasons explained in the previous 
chapter; such a majority was reflected in the Constituent Assembly. A major part of 
the political polarization and struggle had already taken place over the formation of 
the Constituent Assembly due to the lack of any criteria or measures that governed the 
establishment of the Assembly as explained previously. Having a dominant majority 
amid the absence of any constrains that could have guaranteed that the majority would 
not abuse the constitution-making process, the Islamists were not obliged to reach a 
consensus. On the contrary, since they gained a majority, for them the constitutional 
outcome should be a reflection of this majority.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
CHAPTER 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL OUTCOMES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapters of the project, a number of variables 
enabled Islamists in Egypt to gain a predominant majority in the constituent assembly, 
whereas Ennahda Islamists won only a relative majority that forced them to form a 
coalition with secular parties. The qualified majority of Islamists in Egypt shaped the 
proceedings of the constitution-making and led to a constitution that did not achieve a 
consensus among political actors and that increased the polarization between the 
Islamists' and non-Islamists' supporters, whereas in Tunisia the Islamist-led coalition 
was prompted to negotiate and make concessions to avoid the breakdown of the 
process. The main question of this chapter is the following: How did these variables 
impact the constitutional outcomes?           
To answer this question, this chapter presents a comparative analysis of a 
selected number of civil and political rights15 in both constitutions against the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The researcher 
assumes—based on the analysis of the proceedings of both constituent assemblies and 
the points of disagreement between Islamists and non-Islamists presented in the 
previous chapter—that the non-Islamist groups were aiming at reaching a constitution 
that would have been as close as possible to the ICCPR in order to guarantee the 
minimum protection of these rights, whereas the Islamists were trying to impose their 
ideological views. This comparative analysis will help measure the constitutional 
                                                           
15 See Appendix A for the Arabic and English texts of the Articles of both constitutions that have been 
referred to in this chapter. 
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outcomes of both constitution-making processes in terms of producing constitutional 
documents that represent either a compromise with or a break from the non-Islamist 
opposition's agenda. 
The researcher has chosen for two reasons a selected number of articles of 
civil and political rights, namely, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; 
freedom of expression; and the right to non-discrimination. First, the principles of 
non-discrimination and protecting the freedoms of conscience, thought, and religion 
are among the central underpinnings of inclusive and democratic governance. Second, 
these articles were among the central areas of disagreement between the Islamist and 
non-Islamist actors.   
The ICCPR will be used as a baseline in the analysis of both constitutions for 
the following reasons: (1) It is a binding treaty that is part of the International Bill of 
Human Rights along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
(2) It is an international legal frame of reference of the fundamental civil and political 
rights. (3) It is considered as "the most comprehensive and well-established UN treaty 
on civil and political rights" (Joseph, Schultz, & Castan, 2000). (4) The majority of 
the UN state members are parties to the covenant, including Egypt and Tunisia.  
Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion 
The ICCPR does not define the terms “thought,” “conscience,” and “religion.” 
Partsch (1981) presented a comprehensive definition according to which "these terms 
together cover all possible attitudes of the individual toward the world, toward 
society, and toward that which determines his fate and the destiny of the world, be it a 
divinity, some superior being or just reason and rationalism, or chance" (as cited in 
Scheinin, 2010). 
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Article 18 of the ICCPR16 states that everyone is entitled to the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. As pointed out by the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (paragraph 1), the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion “is far-reaching and profound; it encompasses 
freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to 
religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others.” 
Furthermore, “the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected 
equally with the freedom of religion and belief.”  The HRC also stated that religion or 
belief includes “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to 
profess any religion or belief” (HRC General Comment No. 22). The Committee does 
not define religion, and the terms “belief” and “religion” are broadly used to include 
"traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or 
practices analogous to those of traditional religions” (HRC General Comment No. 
22).  
The manifestation or practice of one’s freedom of belief is referred to as “the 
active” component of one’s religious freedom, as opposed to the “passive” 
components, which consist of mere adherence to certain beliefs (Joseph, Schultz, & 
Castan, 2000). Article 18 of the ICCPR distinguishes between the passive and active 
components of these rights. It does not permit any limitations whatsoever on freedom 
of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of 
one’s choice; these freedoms are protected unconditionally (HRC General Comment 
No. 22). Also, Article 19.1 of the same Convention states that it is the "right of 
everyone to hold opinions without interference." Restrictions are permitted on the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief only “if limitations are prescribed by law 
                                                           
16See Annex B for the texts of all the ICCPR Articles referred to in this chapter.  
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and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others” (HRC General Comment No. 22).  
The following section examines freedom of conscience and religion in both 
the Tunisian and Egyptian constitutions, while freedom of thought will be discussed 
in the freedom of expression section. Freedom of thought is not addressed in the same 
article as freedom of belief or religion and conscience in both constitutions, but rather 
it is mentioned in relation to freedom of opinion, expression, media, and publication. 
The 2014 Tunisian Constitution and Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
 The Tunisian constitution addresses freedom of religion in Article 6, one of 
the most controversial and long-debated articles during the constitution-making 
process. The Tunisian constitution, unlike the Egyptian one, commits the state in 
absolute terms to guarantee freedom of belief and the freedom to manifest and 
practice these beliefs to all. In addition, the provision guarantees freedom of 
conscience, which is considered a strong commitment to the state’s obligations under 
the ICCPR (El-Jaadi, 2014). 
However, this article illustrates the Tunisian Constitution's internal 
contradictions, which was the outcome of trying to reach a compromise constitution 
(Mersch, 2014). Article 6 bestows on the state the role of “the guardian of religion”; it 
ensures the impartiality of mosques and places of worship against their use for 
partisan purposes. A new paragraph was introduced in the final deliberations, which 
was the compromise that both the Islamists and non-Islamists reached after the 
mediation of the Quartet as explained in the previous chapter, to oblige the state to 
disseminate the values of moderation and tolerance, to protect sanctities, to prohibit 
the accusation of takfir (calling someone unbeliever) and the incitement to hatred and 
violence, and to confront hatred and violence (Grote, 2014). The article is ambivalent, 
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as the meaning of protecting religion and the sacred and the definition of sanctities are 
unclear. In addition, protecting sanctities contradicts freedom of conscience and poses 
a real threat to freedom of expression, as will be explained in the next section 
(Mersch, 2014). These clauses could open the door for the most repressive 
interpretation in the name of protecting the sacred, and the ambiguity allows lawyers, 
judges, and politicians to interpret the clauses as they see fit (Guellali, 2014). 
Regardless of the ambiguity and contradiction, the language of Article 6, 
which allows freedom of belief and practices for all and freedom of conscience, is a 
clear commitment to international law under Article 18 of the ICCPR and United 
Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 (2011) that calls upon the states to 
take actions to “foster religious freedom and pluralism,” to “criminalize incitement to 
imminent violence based on religion or belief,” and to “promote the full respect and 
protection for places of worship and religious sites.” Finally, although Article 6 was 
one of the most disputed articles in the constitution-making process, and despite the 
caveats in the article, the final outcomes came as close as possible to Article 18 of the 
ICCPR.  
The 2012 Egyptian Constitution and Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
Article 43 of the Egyptian constitution established the universal freedom of 
belief by stating that it is “a guaranteed right” (ةنوصم داقتعلاا ةيرح). Yet, in the same 
article, the freedom to practice religious rites and establish places of worship was only 
granted to the followers of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, as regulated by law. This 
article distinguished freedom of religion or belief from the freedom to manifest and 
practice this religion or belief. It protected the former in absolute terms, while it 
restricted the latter to the followers of the previously identified religions. This 
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provision was compatible with neither the ICCPR nor the definition of the Egyptian 
Supreme Constitutional Court, which defined freedom of religion or belief as  
the freedom of not to be coerced to adopt, renounce or profess particular 
religion or belief [...] Freedom of belief cannot be separated from freedom to 
manifest or express one’s religion or belief, both clauses are complementary. 
The second clause is a vehicle for expression of the first one, and both cannot 
be separated. No limitations whatsoever could be put on the first clause, 
freedom of religion or belief, while the second clause can be only restricted 
when necessary to protect public safety, order, morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. (SCC, Case No. 8, 1996) 
Article 43 was also regarded as a step back from the previous Egyptian 
constitutions from 1923 to 1971, as well as in March 2011 Constitutional 
Declarations, which stated that the State guarantees freedom of belief and practice 
(Al-Asuity, 2013). Further, Article 43 discriminated against other religious minorities 
in Egypt beside the above identified religions, such as Baha’is. The Constitution did 
not have any reference to freedom of conscience, as this freedom entailed the right of 
individuals to be independent from the collective conscience, especially in matters 
related to religion and conviction (El-Jaadi, 2014). Hence, it could be argued that the 
Constitution did not rise-up to the ICCPR standards of the freedom to hold and 
manifest one’s own beliefs, whether theistic, non-theistic, or atheistic. 
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression 
ICCPR Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression 
Freedom of expression is "the right of every individual to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers … This right is important for the personal 
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development and dignity of every individual and is vital for the fulfillment of other 
human rights" (Freedom House, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015a). Freedoms of 
opinion and expression constitute "the foundation stone for every free and democratic 
society. The two freedoms are closely related, with freedom of expression providing 
the vehicle for the exchange and development of opinions" (HRC General Comment 
No. 34, paras. 2-4). 
According to General Comment No. 34 (para. 9) on Article 19, "all forms of 
opinion are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or 
religious nature” under the first clause of Article 19. The freedom to hold an opinion 
is a passive action, and it is an absolute freedom. However, the absolute nature of this 
freedom ceases to exist when one expresses or manifests his/her opinion (Joseph, 
Schultz, & Castan, 2000, p. 387). Freedom of expression is closely related to freedom 
of the media and the right to access information (HRC General Comment No. 32). 
This section focuses only on freedom of expression. 
Limitations on the right to freedoms of expression are permitted with regard to 
"respecting the rights or reputations of others or to the protection of national security 
or of public order or of public health or morals” (Article 19). HRC General Comment 
No. 32 elaborates on these limitations indicating that “when a State party imposes 
restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy 
the right itself” (para. 21). General Comment No. 10 on Article 19, which was 
replaced in 2011 by General Comment No. 23 on Article 19, states that the interplay 
between the principle of freedom of expression and the limitations/restrictions 
imposed by the state determines the actual scope of the individual’s right. 
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The Tunisian Constitution and Freedoms of Opinion and Expression 
In the Tunisian constitution, Article 31 guarantees, in absolute terms, 
“freedom of opinion, thought, expression, media and publication … these freedoms 
shall not be subject to prior censorship.” The right to access information and 
communication networks is also guaranteed in Article 32. The scope of freedom of 
opinions and expression was not clearly defined in the constitution, yet Article 49 of 
the Tunisian Constitution provides constitutional guarantees for the application of all 
the rights and freedoms in the constitution. It states that the law determines the 
limitations to the rights and freedoms mentioned in the constitution on the condition 
that it does not compromise its essence and remains compatible with a civil and 
democratic state. The article lists limitations that are in line with the third paragraph 
of Article 19 of the ICCPR, namely, “protecting the rights of others or based on the 
requirements of public order, national defense, public health or public morals.” 
Article 49 has been particularly praised for respecting the “proportionality between 
these limitations and their motives” (Reporters without Borders, 2014). 
There are concerns, however, that listing public morals as one of the 
limitations, together with the reference to Tunisia’s Arab Islamic identity in the 
preamble, may allow for a conservative interpretation that violates freedom of 
expression (Williams & Mahmoud, 2014).  Also, as mentioned in the previous 
section, the second paragraph of Article 6 (referred to in the freedom of religion 
section) which “protects sanctities and prevents attacks on them,” due to its 
ambivalent language that fails to define sanctities or what could be considered as an 
attack against them could also be interpreted to curtail freedom of expression when it 
comes to religious matters. 
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The 2012 Egyptian Constitution and Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression  
Article 45 of the Egyptian 2012 constitution guaranteed freedom of thought 
and opinion in absolute terms: “Freedom of thought and opinion shall be guaranteed.” 
The second clause of the same Article guaranteed in absolute terms as well the right 
of every individual “to express an opinion and to disseminate it verbally, in writing or 
illustration, or by any other means of publication and expression.” Other articles in 
the constitution, however, contradicted this provision and constitute violations of 
freedom of expression. Article 44 prohibited “undermining or subjecting to prejudice 
all messengers and prophets,” and Article 31 prohibited insulting and showing 
contempt to any human being. The vague wordings of these articles could have led to 
extremely conservative interpretations that jeopardize freedom of expression, and 
“[provide] for defamation to remain a criminal offence” (Amnesty International, 
2012). Article 44 could have restricted any kind of expression of opinions of a 
religious nature, and Article 31 could have been interpreted as advocating the 
prosecution of critics of the government (Amnesty International, 2012; Human Rights 
Watch, 2012; Al-Ali, 2012).   
It is worth mentioning here that Article 81 defined the scope of the rights 
granted in the constitution as follows: “Rights and freedoms pertaining to the 
individual citizen shall not be subject to disruption or detraction [ ةقيصللا تايرحلاو قوقحلا
اصاقتنا وأ  ًليطعت لبقت لا نطاوملا صخشب]. No law that regulates the practice of the rights and 
freedoms shall include what would constrain their essence.” The third paragraph of 
this provision, however, contradicted the first two; it restricted the freedoms and 
rights mentioned in the constitution by stating that these rights and freedoms “shall be 
practiced in a manner not conflicting with the principles pertaining to the State and 
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Society Part of Chapter Two included in this Constitution.” The part referred to in 
Chapter Two had articles on the state’s role in “safeguarding ethics, public morality 
and public order, and fostering a high level of education and of religious and patriotic 
values” (Article 11), as well as safeguarding “the cultural and linguistic constituents 
of society” (Article 12). Furthermore, it established family as the cornerstone of 
society, “founded on religion, morality and patriotism” (Article 10). It could be 
argued that the ambivalent nature of Article 81 and linking it to articles included in 
Chapter Two could have been interpreted in a way that jeopardizes the essence of the 
rights and freedoms mentioned in the constitution, particularly freedom of expression 
(Al-Ali, 2012).  
The Right to Non-Discrimination 
Discrimination is defined as "the systematic denial of certain peoples' or 
groups' full human rights because of who they are or what they believe (Amnesty 
International, 2015b). The Right to Non-discrimination is  
a cross-cutting principle in international human rights law. The principle is 
present in all the major human rights treaties and provides the central theme of 
some of international human rights conventions such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. (OHCHR, 2015) 
The principle prohibits discrimination on the basis of a list of non-exhaustive 
categories such as sex, race, color and other bases. The principle of non-
discrimination is complemented by the principle of equality, as stated in Article 1 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights” (OHCHR, 2015).  
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There is heavy emphasis on the rights to non-discrimination in the ICCPR, 
since discrimination is “at the root of virtually all human rights abuses” (Joseph, 
Schultz, & Castan, 2000, p. 519). The ICCPR contains comprehensive prohibitions on 
discrimination in Articles 2(1) and 26. This is reinforced by Article 3 prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, Article 4(1) prohibiting discrimination in 
relation to derogation, 23(4) regarding “equality of rights and responsibilities of 
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution,” Article 24(1) in 
relation to equal rights for all children, Article 25 that provides for the equal 
participation in public life of all citizens, and Article 20 that requires states to prohibit 
incitements to discrimination. Therefore, it is suggested that equality and non-
discrimination is the dominant theme of the Covenant (Joseph et al., 2000, pp. 518–
519). 
The HRC General Comment No. 18 (para.1) on the Right to Non-
Discrimination defines discrimination as  
imply[ing] any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based 
on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 
The HRC draws the attention of the state parties to their obligation under the ICCPR 
to sometimes take measures to “guarantee the equality of rights of the persons 
concerned” and “to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate 
conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the 
Covenant.”  
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The Tunisian 2014 Constitution and the Right to Non-discrimination 
The Tunisian constitution states in Article 21 that “All citizens, male and 
female alike, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any 
discrimination. The State guarantees to citizens individual and collective rights, and 
provides them with the conditions to lead a dignified life.” Moreover, the constitution 
addresses Article 3 of the ICCPR, by guaranteeing, in Article 46, “equal opportunities 
between men and women in the bearing of all the various responsibilities in all 
fields.” The language of this article came as a compromise after significant lobbying 
exercised by civil society organizations and the non-Islamist groups to remove the 
suggested article that assigned women a complementary status to men, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. The Tunisian Constitution also commits the state to “seek[ing] 
to achieve equal representation for women and men in elected councils, and take the 
necessary measures to eliminate violence against women.” It is worth mentioning here 
that the constitution uses the phrase “all citizens, male and female” in Article 40 in 
relation to the right to work and also in the preamble to emphasize the concept of 
equality between the sexes. In addition, the state is committed to protecting all 
children without discrimination (Article 47), protecting “the persons with disabilities 
against all forms of discrimination,” and “[taking] all measures to ensure their full 
integration into society” (Article 48). 
The wording of Article 21, however, limits the principle of equality and non-
discrimination to all citizens, men and women, and not to all persons within the 
Tunisian territory. This does not conform to ICCPR Article 2 that obligates states to 
“respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 
although Article 21 states that all citizens have equal rights, Article 74 contradicts this 
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by allowing only followers of Islam to run for the presidency (a condition that is not 
present in the 2012 Egyptian constitution). The HRC General Comment No. 22 on the 
right to non-discrimination indicates that “measures restricting eligibility for 
government service to members of the predominant religion […] are not in 
accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the 
guarantee of equal protection under Article 26.”  
The 2012 Egyptian Constitution and the Right to Non-Discrimination 
Article 33 of the Egyptian 2012 constitution stated that all “citizens are equal 
before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination.” The 
concept of equality in public rights and duties was referred to in other articles as well: 
Article 6 stated that “the political system is based on the principles of democracy and 
Shura (counsel), and citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in public rights 
and duties)”; Article 8 stated that the “State guarantees the means to achieve justice, 
equality and freedom”; and Article 9 committed the State to “ensure safety, security 
and equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination.” Nonetheless, Article 
33 did not meet Egypt’s obligations under the ICCPR Covenant for the following 
reasons: 
(1) Article (33) protected only Egyptian citizens and not all persons within the 
Egyptian territory, as mentioned in ICCPR Article 2(1). This article 
excluded refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and all foreigners living 
within the Egyptian territory (Amnesty International, 2012). 
(2) The constitution did not have a reference to the grounds upon which 
discrimination was prohibited including sex, color, religion, and other 
grounds. In fact, the list of the specific prohibited grounds was removed 
from Article 33 in the last draft as mentioned in the previous chapter. It is 
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worth mentioning here that all the previous Egyptian constitutions from 
1923 to 1971 had a reference to the prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
The SCC mentioned in its definition of the right to non-discrimination that 
it regarded the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination that was 
mentioned in the 1971 constitution as non-exhaustive and that the Court 
considered other grounds of discrimination to ensure the principle of 
equality for all (SCC, 1989).     
(3) The constitution did not mention equality between men and women, and 
there was no reference to prohibiting discrimination against women or 
protecting women’s rights. The only reference to women was in Article 
10, where “the state shall provide for special care and protection for single 
mothers, divorced women and widows” (Amnesty International, 2012; 
Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
(4) The constitution did not refer to the measures that should be taken to 
“guarantee the equality of rights of the persons concerned” or “affirmative 
action in order to diminish or eliminate discrimination” as stated in the 
HRC General Comments.    
The State and Religion 
A recurrent theme is related to the rights addressed in the previous sections, 
and particularly the right to non-discrimination, is the role of religion in the state's 
affairs. Both the Egyptian and Tunisian constitutions recognize Islam as the religion 
of the state, yet recognizing an official religion of the state in itself is not against the 
international norms included in the ICCPR, as long as this does not entail infringing 
on the rights of the followers of other religions, according to HRC Comment No. 22 
on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
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In the Tunisian constitution, Article 1 states that Islam is the religion of the 
state, yet Article 2 affirms that Tunisia is a civil state that is based on citizenship, the 
will of the people, and the supremacy of the law; neither of these articles can be 
amended. There are also references in the preamble, which is part of the constitution, 
according to Article 145, stating that the constitution is based on the people’s 
commitment to the teachings of Islam and its open and its moderate objectives, and to 
adherence to the Arab/Islamic identity of Tunisia. However, there is no reference in 
the constitution to Islamic law as a source of legislation, which is another concession 
that the Islamists made under the pressure of non-Islamist groups and the civil society 
organizations, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The state is granted the role of 
protector of religion, although the clause is ambiguous; it does not specify that the 
state is the protector of Islam but that it is responsible for protecting all religions and 
the sanctities of all religions, in addition to preventing calls for takfir (calling others 
an unbeliever) and incitement to hatred and violence. The constitution also guarantees 
the freedom of conscience and belief and the practice of freedom of beliefs for all. It 
commits the state to guarantee equality to all citizens in rights and duties and for the 
public administration to serve the citizens in accordance with the principles of 
impartiality and equality (Article 15). However, Article 74 states that the president 
must be of the Muslim faith. The oath that members of parliament (Article 58), the 
president (Articles 76), and the government (Article 89) must take is religious 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2013). Such measures are 
considered discriminatory under the ICCPR as explained above. 
In the Egyptian constitution, Article 2 stated that Islam is the religion of the 
state and the principles of Sharia are the principal source of legislation. Article 3 
granted the rights of only Egyptian Christians and Jews to follow the principles of 
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their respective religions with regards to personal status laws, religious affairs, or the 
selection of spiritual leaders. This article excluded other religious minorities in Egypt; 
this, together with confining freedom of religious practice to the followers of Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism, was considered discrimination under the ICCPR. HRC 
General Comment No. 22 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion requires 
state parties to take “actions against infringement of the rights of religious minorities 
and of other religious groups to exercise the rights guaranteed by Articles 18 and 27.” 
Another problematic article was the newly introduced Article 219 that declared 
Islamic jurisprudence as the basis of legislation: “the principles of Islamic Sharia 
include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible 
sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.” This also 
discriminated against Shia' Muslims, whose legal traditions differ in some ways from 
those of Sunni Muslims. In addition, the diversity of stances, justifications, laws, 
opinions, and sources in Islamic jurisprudence could have led to interpretations of 
legislation that vary from the ultra-conservative to the more progressive (Theodorakis, 
2013). Article 219, together with the lack of references to equality between men and 
women and to measures that guarantee protection against discrimination for minority 
groups, did not meet Egypt’s obligations under the ICCPR.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, based on analysis of the selected number of articles in both the 
2012 Egyptian and 2014 Tunisian constitutions in relation to the ICCPR, it can be 
argued that the articles of the Tunisian constitution came closer to the ICCPR as an 
attempt at reaching a compromise with the vision of the non-Islamist groups, whereas 
the articles in the 2012 Egyptian constitution drifted from the ICCPR, and the 
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vision/agenda of the Islamist majority was predominant in the constitutional texts, as 
indicated in the following:     
(1) The Tunisian constitution, in conformity with the ICCPR, commits the 
state to guarantee freedom of belief and conscience and religious practices 
for all, whereas the Egyptian constitution confined the freedom of 
religious practices to the followers of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, 
leaving to the law to regulate the freedom, and does not include any 
reference to freedom of conscience. 
(2) The Tunisian constitution includes constitutional guarantees for the 
application of all the rights and freedoms included in the constitution and 
in defining the limitations to these rights and freedoms, which are to a 
great extent in conformity with the ICCPR, in addition to underlining the 
importance of respecting the proportionality between the limitations on 
rights and their motives. The Egyptian constitution, on the other hand, 
confined the application of the rights and freedoms mentioned therein to 
be in conformity with the principles pertaining to the State and Society 
part (Chapter Two) of the constitution that includes articles on the state’s 
role in safeguarding ethics, public morality, and public order.  
(3) The Tunisian constitution emphasizes equality between men and women, 
and included measures to ensure equal opportunities for both sexes and 
equal representation on elected councils, whereas the Egyptian 
constitution remained silent on this matter. 
(4) The Tunisian constitution declares the civil nature of the state (in an 
unchangeable Article) and did not include any reference to Sharia. The 
Egyptian constitution, on the other hand, maintained the principles of 
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Sharia as the source of legislation, and introduced a new article defining 
the principles of Sharia as the large body of Sunni jurisprudence. This 
article could have allowed for a wide range of interpretations and thus 
legislation that could be discriminatory under the norms of the ICCPR.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 The objective of this master's project was to analyze the different phases of 
the constitution-making processes for the 2012 Egyptian and the 2014 Tunisian 
constitutions. Both countries embarked on the process of constitution-making in quite 
similar post-uprising contexts characterized by political uncertainty, the emergence of 
a plethora of new political and social actors, the rise of Islamists to power, security 
and economic challenges, and extreme polarization and political violence. 
Accordingly, the constitution-making processes in both countries were faced with 
similar challenges and risks; chief among them was the risk of the manipulation of 
one powerful political group of the whole process and redirecting it to serve the 
group's interests and consolidate its powers.  
 In both countries, Islamists—the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists in Egypt 
and the Ennahda Islamist party—emerged as the most organized and powerful 
political power compared with the non-Islamist political groups, which had the 
potential of promptly filling in the vacuum caused by the downfall of the ruling 
parties in both countries. Soon after the beginning of the transitional period, the 
mistrust—inherited from the former authoritarian regimes—among political and 
social factions, loosely referred to as the Islamist and non-Islamist groups, started to 
emerge in addition to tension that resulted in extreme social polarization that 
threatened the whole transitional process. The interaction of these actors during the 
transition determined the construction of the new regime's governing institutions. To 
put it in the words of Schmitter (1986), actors struggle and contest during transition 
not only to satisfy their immediate interests and the interests of those whom they 
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represent but also to define the rules and procedures that will likely determine the 
winners and losers in the future. During the uncertainty of transition and legal void, 
constitution-making emerged as a key process for shaping the character of the new 
regime. The constitution-making process was the nucleus of transition, which shaped 
the sequence of the transitional process, in addition to establishing the new governing 
regime. Thus, it was important to study the first two constitution-making processes of 
the Arab uprisings and to examine why the 2012 Egyptian constitution process went 
wrong while the 2014 Tunisian constitution-making avoided the worst-case scenario. 
 The body of the constitution-making literature as a distinctive field of analysis 
can be traced back to Elster (1995), who highlighted the challenges of the process and 
proposed a number of recommendations of measures and mechanisms for 
constitution-making. Elster's recommendations have been developed in the 
constitution-making literature into hypotheses that are being tested by studying 
individual cases. The literature of constitution-making is still lacking a theory or a 
paradigm for structuring the constitution-making process (Landau 2012, & Lang 
2013). For Landau (2013), policy makers and scholars should not focus solely on 
designing constitution-making in an attempt to reach some idealized end state, but 
rather developing a "risk averse" model of constitutionalism, where the major goal is 
to prevent democratic breakdown (Landau, 2013, p. 613). In Landau's model, the 
central challenge to constitution-making is how to constrain unilateral exercise of 
power. If political forces represented in the assemblies are left unconstrained or 
poorly constrained, they can reshape the whole transitional process to create a quasi-
authoritarian regime or impose their own constitutions on a minority which in turn 
would lead to constitutional breakdown (Landau, 2012, p. 923). This is what 
happened in the Egyptian case.  
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 The conceptual framework of the project has made use of the constitution-
making scholarship in defining the different variables that affected the processes in 
both countries and in turn the outcomes. These variables are among the factors 
pointed out by Elster (1995) and Landau (2013) that should be considered in the 
constitution-making process including the following: (1) the establishment of a 
specialized constituent committee apart from the ordinary legislative bodies. (2) The 
role of legislators and institutional interests in the constitution-making process. (3) 
Electoral system for establishing the constituent assembly. (4) The decision-making 
rules throughout the process of drafting the constitution, i.e. how the constitution 
drafters take decisions. In general, smaller groups tend to claim equal voting power in 
the constitution-making body; whereas the larger or majority groups insist on a voting 
system that reflects the numerical strength of their constituencies, which was a central 
challenge in the constitution-making processes in both Tunisian and Egypt. (5) The 
risk of having a majority that manipulates and abuses the constitution-making 
process, and (6) the time limit and delaying technique of the constitution-making 
process.    
The master's project poised three questions: Why did Islamists in Egypt, 
represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, succeed in gaining an 
absolute majority (50+1) at the constituent assembly, while Ennahda Islamist in 
Tunisia gained only a relative majority? How did having an absolute majority in 
Egypt as opposed to a relative majority in Tunisia impact the proceedings of 
constitution-making process in each country? How did the design of the constitution-
making process impact the constitutional outcome? 
 In answering the first questions, the researcher has identified two independent 
variables. The first independent variable was the background factors. This section has 
111 
demonstrated that the different social and political milieus in both countries resulted 
in different weights and outlooks of social and political actors, which in turn 
influenced the measures and mechanisms set for the constitution-making process. In 
Tunisia, on the one hand, Bourguiba's modernization project laid down the foundation 
of a progressive and urban state with a high literacy rate and vibrant civil society, 
where religion ceased to exist in the public sphere, and religious institutions and 
education were monitored by the state. The Islamist movement in Tunisia represented 
by the Ennahda Islamist party committed itself to multi-party democracy and political 
pluralism and to the progressive rights that women were granted. It also forged ties 
with the human rights league, the labor movement, and other opposition parties 
against the regime's repression regardless of the ideological differences. In Egypt, on 
the other hand, the army became a main player in the Egyptian politics since 1952. 
Egypt went through different stages that resulted in dramatic political and social 
transformations, which led to lack of a strong opposition movement, lack of a vibrant 
civil society, significantly increased religiosity and conservatism in the Egyptian 
society since the 1970s, and the rise of Islamists groups with wide public support. 
Egypt was the cradle of the Islamist movement, where the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist groups were founded. 
The second independent variable is the measures and mechanisms of 
constitution-making, or the agenda setting stage. The section demonstrated that the 
measures for the constitution-making process were designed specifically to prevent 
one actor from manipulating the transitional process. This was evident in the 
following points: (1) the High Commission that drafted the NCA electoral law and 
supervised the work of the government was representative of most social, political 
actors and civil society, and the electoral law was intentionally designed to prevent 
112 
any candidate-list from gaining absolute majority and allowing more representation of 
women and youth.  By contrast, the crisis of the constitution-making process in Egypt 
started with the SCAF’s Declaration in February 2011 that led to the non-transparent 
establishment of a non-representative committee to introduce amendments to the 
suspended 1971 constitution, and then the March Constitutional Referendum, which 
was rushed and paved the way for the consolidation of the Islamist-majority 
dominance in the parliament with its two chambers. The deficiencies of the 
mechanisms that governed the constitution-making process did not ensure the equal 
participation of all stakeholders. 
In answering the second question, the proceedings of the constitution-making 
processes in both countries were analyzed. In Tunisia, Ennahda Islamists, who only 
gained a relative majority at the constituent assembly, were forced to form a coalition 
with two other secular parties to have the right to form a government. The ruling 
coalition, the Troika, although it had an absolute majority, still did not have the two-
thirds majority that would have enabled it to pass a constitution alone. Accordingly, 
failing to reach consensus appeared to be the only option to avoid submitting the 
constitution for a national referendum in which the chances were that the Ennahda-led 
coalition would lose in an environment full of political polarization and political 
violence for which the Troika were blamed. In Tunisia, when the process had reached 
an impasse and the opposition withdrew, the assembly suspended its work, and there 
was a powerful nonpartisan civil society that was capable of playing the role of 
mediator and brokering a breakthrough.  
The situation in Egypt was quite different. A major part of the political 
polarization and struggle had already taken place over the formation of the constituent 
assembly due to the lack of any criteria or measures that governed the establishment 
113 
of the assembly as explained previously. Having a predominant majority amid the 
absence of any constraints that could have guaranteed that the majority would not 
abuse the constitution-making process, the Islamists were not obliged to reach a 
consensus. On the contrary, since they gained a majority, the constitutional outcome 
should be a reflection of this majority. 
The last chapter presented a comparative analysis of a selected number of civil 
and political rights in both constitutions against the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The researcher assumed—based on the analysis of the 
proceedings of both constituent assemblies and the points of disagreements between 
the Islamists and non-Islamists—that the non-Islamist groups were aiming at reaching 
a constitution that would have been as close as possible to the ICCPR, while the 
Islamists were trying to impose their own ideological views. The result of the analysis 
was that the articles of the Tunisian constitution came closer to the ICCPR as an 
attempt at reaching a compromise with the vision of the non-Islamist groups, whereas 
the articles in the 2012 Egyptian constitution drifted from the ICCPR, and the 
vision/agenda of the Islamist majority was predominant in the constitutional texts.  
Finally, it could be concluded that the analysis of both the Tunisian and 
Egyptian constitution-making processes confirmed the validity of the hypothesis of 
the master's project. In the Egyptian case, the Islamist majority was able to impose 
their own constitution and produce a constitution that did not have a consensus among 
political factions and did not maintain the internationally recognized rights referred to 
previously, and finally led to a breakdown in the transition process. In the Tunisian 
case, the electoral laws and bylaws, in addition to the presence of a powerful civil 
society that played the role of mediator, constrained the Ennahda Islamist majority, 
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thereby avoiding a breakdown of the process, and producing a compromise and 
rights-maintaining constitution. 
Lessons Learned 
 There are a number of learned lessons that could be concluded for policy 
makers and researchers: 
(1) Researchers and policy makers studying countries in transition should give 
more attention to the constitution-making process as a political project that 
shapes the transitional process and structures the new regime as well. 
(2) Political scientists, researchers and scholars of constitutionalism, 
comparative constitutional law, and constitutional politics have ample 
areas of research in the constitution-making literature as there is a need for 
developing a model or paradigm for constitution-making. The need for a 
new constitution generally arises in circumstances that are likely to work 
against good constitution-making, which in turn invites procedures based 
on "threat-based bargaining." Thus, a model or a paradigm is needed to 
avoid manipulating the constitution-making process that could lead to 
establishing authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime, to consolidating 
the power of a particular group, or to violating the rights of political, 
ethnic, or religious minorities.  
 Finally, based on analyzing these two case-studies, the researcher can draw a 
number of learned lessons that could give insights for researchers interested in 
developing a model for constitution-making: 
(1) The phase of setting the agenda is extremely vital, shaping the successive 
phases. All actors should be represented in this phase to produce measures 
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and mechanisms that would result in a representative forum of 
constitution-making. 
(2) There should be defined and transparent laws or rules for electing or 
selecting the members of any forum of constitution-making.  
(3) The electoral laws or the rules for constituent assembly should be 
designed to prevent a particular group (an executive authority, a political 
group, or any other group) from gaining an absolute majority. The 
researcher thinks that in the Egyptian case, a proportional electoral law 
might not have prevented an Islamist majority in the assembly, as already 
none of the Islamist group managed to get an absolute majority in the 
parliamentary elections, yet together they had a qualified majority. 
Accordingly, one of the measures that could have been useful in the 
Egyptian case is a quota rule that would have guaranteed that none of the 
group had had an absolute majority. But the question remains how this 
rule could be implemented or even imposed given the context of the 
Egyptian transition. 
(4) The elections for a constituent assembly should not be accelerated to give 
a chance to the less organized or smaller actors to get ready and participate 
in the process.  
(5) The constitution-making process should be given an appropriate time 
frame. It should not be rushed as was the case in Egypt or left open as was 
the case in Tunisia.    
(6) A two-thirds majority should be required to approve individual articles of 
the constitution or the constitution as a whole to force the different actors 
to make concessions and reach consensus,  
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(7) A crucial factor in the constitution-making process is external constraints, 
or what Elster (1991) referred to as "upstream constraint," although it 
could be argued that it is an undemocratic measure to have external 
constraints on a process that is supposed to guarantee transition to a 
democratic regime. As Landau (2012) postulates, it is part of the 
paradoxes of the constitution-making process. Analyzing the Egyptian and 
Tunisian cases has demonstrated that having a nonpartisan powerful civil 
society as an external actor played an extremely important role in 
mediating a breakthrough. In Egypt, none of the actors were qualified to 
play this role. 
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APPENDIX A  
ARTICLES OF CONSTITUTIONS 
 
A table of the Arabic and English texts of the articles analyzed in chapter 4 organized by 
topic. 
Tunisian 2014 Constitution 
 
Egyptian 2012 Constitution Topic 
لصفلا (6) 
ةلودلا ةيعار ،نيدلل ةلفاك ةيرحل دقتعملا 
ريمضلاو ةسراممو رئاعشلا ،ةينيدلا ةنماض 
دايحل دجاسملا ةدابعلا رودو نع فيظوتلا 
يبزحلا. 
مزتلت ةلودلا رشنب ميق لادتعلاا حماستلاو 
ةيامحبو تاسّدقملا عنمو لينلا ،اهنم امك 
مزتلت عنمب تاوعد ريفكتلا ضيرحتلاو ىلع 
ةيهاركلا فنعلاو يدصتلابو اهل 
Article (6)  
The State shall protect religion, 
guarantee freedom of belief and 
conscience and religious 
practices, and ensure the 
impartiality of mosques and 
places of worship away from 
partisan instrumentalisation.  
The State shall commit to 
spreading the values of 
moderation and tolerance, 
protecting sanctities and 
preventing attacks of them, just as 
it shall commit to preventing calls 
for takfeer [calling another 
Muslim an unbeliever] and 
incitement to hatred and violence 
and to confronting them. 
( ةداملا43) 
ةيرح داقتعلاا ةنوصم. لفكتو ةلودلا 
ةيرح ةسرامم رئاعشلا ةينيدلا ةماقإو رود 
ةدابعلا نايدلأل ؛ةيوامسلا كلذو ىلع 
وحنلا يذلا همظني نوناقلا. 
Articles (43) 
Freedom of belief is an 
inviolable right. 
The State shall guarantee the 
freedom to practice religious 
rites and to establish places of 
worship for the divine 
religions, as regulated by law. 
Freedom of thought, 
Conscience, and 
Religion 
لصفلا (31) 
ةيرح يأرلا ركفلاو ريبعتلاو ملعلإاو 
رشنلاو ةنومضم. 
لا زوجي ةسرامم ةباقر ةقبسم ىلع هذه 
تايرحلا. 
Article (31) 
Freedom of opinion, thought, 
expression, media and publication 
( ةداملا31) 
 عمتجملا لفكي ،ناسنإ لكل قح ةماركلا
مارتحا ةلودلاو.اهتيامحو اه 
 وأ ناسنإ يأ ةناهإ لاحب زوجي لاو
هؤاردزا. 
Article 31 
Freedom of 
Expression 
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shall be guaranteed. 
These freedoms shall not be 
subject to prior censorship. 
( لصفلا32) 
 يف قحلاو ملعلإا يف قحلا ةلودلا نمضت
 نامض ىلإ ةلودلا ىعست .ةمولعملا ىلإ ذافنلا
كبش ىلإ ذافنلا يف قحلا .لاصتلاا تا 
Article (32) 
The State shall guarantee the right 
to information and the right to 
access to information. The State 
seeks to guarantee the right to 
access to communication 
networks.  
 
Dignity is the right of every 
human being, safeguarded by 
the State. 
Insulting or showing contempt 
toward any human being shall 
be prohibited 
( ةداملا44) 
 لسرلل ضيرعتلا وأ ةءاسلإا رظحت
يبنلأاوةفاك ءا 
Article 44 
Insult or abuse of all religious 
messengers and prophets shall 
be prohibited. 
 
( ةداملا45) 
ةيرح  ركفلايأرلاو ةلوفكم. 
لكلو ناسنإ قح ريبعتلا  نعهيأر لوقلاب 
وأ ةباتكلا وأ ريوصتلا وأ ريغ كلذ نم 
لئاسو رشنلا ريبعتلاو. 
Article (45) 
Freedom of thought and 
opinion shall be guaranteed. 
Every individual has the right 
to express an opinion and to 
disseminate it verbally, in 
writing or illustration, or by 
any other means of publication 
and expression. 
( ةداملا47) 
 تانايبلاو تامولعملا ىلع لوصحلا
اصحلإاو ،اهنع حاصفلإاو ،قئاثولاو تاء
 ؛نطاوم لكل ةلودلا هلفكت قح ،اهلوادتو
 ،ةصاخلا ةايحلا ةمرح سمي لا امب
 نملأا عم ضراعتي لاو ،نيرخلآا قوقحو
.ىموقلا 
 ةماعلا قئاثولا عاديإ دعاوق نوناقلا مظنيو
 ىلع لوصحلا ةقيرطو ،اهظفحو
 ،اهئاطعإ ضفر نم ملظتلاو ،تامولعملا
ع بترتي دق امو نم ضفرلا اذه ىل
ةلءاسم. 
Article (47) 
Access to information, data, 
documents and statistics, and 
the disclosure and circulation 
thereof, is a right guaranteed 
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by the state, in a manner that 
does not violate the sanctity of 
private life or the rights of 
others, and that does not 
conflict with national security. 
The law regulates the rules for 
filing and archiving public 
documents, the means of 
access to information, the 
means of complaint when 
access is refused, and the 
consequent accountability. 
 
لصفلا (15) 
ةرادلإا ةيمومعلا يف ةمدخ نطاوملا حلاصلاو 
،ماعلا ت مّظن لمعتو قفو ئدابم دايحلا 
ةاواسملاو ةيرارمتساو قفرملا 
،ماعلا قفوو دعاوق ةيفافشلا ةهازنلاو 
ةعاجنلاو ةلءاسملاو. 
Article 15 
Public administration shall serve 
citizens and the public interest, 
and shall be organized and 
operate in accordance with the 
principles of impartiality, 
equality, continuity of provision 
of public services, and the rules of 
transparency, integrity, efficiency 
and accountability 
لصفلا) 21) 
نونطاوملا تانطاوملاو نوواستم يف وقحلاق 
،تابجاولاو مهو ءاوس مامأ نوناقلا نم ريغ 
زييمت. 
نمضت ةلودلا نينطاوملل تانطاوملاو قوقحلا 
تايرحلاو ةيدرفلا ،ةّماعلاو ئيهتو مهل بابسأ 
شيعلا ميركلا 
Article (21) 
All citizens, male and female 
alike, have equal rights and 
duties, and are equal before the 
law without any discrimination. 
The State guarantees to citizens 
individual and collective rights, 
and provides them with the 
conditions to lead a dignified life. 
 لصفلا(40) 
لمعلا قح لكل نطاوم ،ةنطاومو ذختتو 
ةلودلا ريبادتلا ةيرورضلا هنامضل ىلع 
( ةداملا6) 
موقي ماظنلا يسايسلا ىلع ئدابم 
اةيطارقميدل ،ىروشلاو ةنطاوملاو يتلا 
ىوست نيب عيمج نينطاوملا يف قوقحلا 
تابجاولاو ،ةماعلا ةيددعتلاو ةيسايسلا 
،ةيبزحلاو لوادتلاو يملسلا ،ةطلسلل 
لصفلاو نيب تاطلسلا نزاوتلاو ،اهنيب 
ةدايسو ،نوناقلا مارتحاو قوقح ناسنلإا 
؛هتايرحو كلذو هلك ىلع وحنلا نيبملا يف 
وتسدلار. لاو زوجي مايق بزح يسايس 
ىلع ساسأ ةقرفتلا نيب ؛نينطاوملا ببسب 
سنجلا وأ لصلأا وأ نيدلا. 
Article (6) 
The political system is based 
on the principles of democracy 
and shura (counsel), citizenship 
(under which all citizens are 
equal in rights and duties), 
multi-party pluralism, peaceful 
transfer of power, separation of 
powers and the balance 
between them, the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights 
and freedoms; all as elaborated 
in the Constitution.  No 
political party shall be formed 
that discriminates on the basis 
of gender, origin or religion. 
( ةدام6 )– ةيناثلا ةرقفلا 
 ساسأ ىلع يسايس بزح مايق زوجي لاو
 وأ سنجلا ببسب ؛نينطاوملا نيب ةقرفتلا
نيدلا وأ لصلأا. 
Article (6) – Para. (2) 
No political party shall be 
Non-Discrimination 
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ساسأ ةءافكلا نلإاوفاص. 
لكلو نطاوم ةنطاومو قحلا يف لمعلا يف 
فورظ ةقئلا رجأبو لداع. 
Article (40)  
Work is a right for every citizen, 
male and female alike. The State 
shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure the availability of work 
on the basis of competence and 
fairness.  
All citizens, male and female 
alike, shall have the right to 
adequate working conditions and 
to a fair wage.  
( لصفلا46) 
مزتلت ةلودلا ةيامحب قوقحلا ةبستكملا ةأرملل 
لمعتو ىلع اهمعد اهريوطتو. 
نمضت ةلودلا ؤفاكت صرفلا نيب لجرلا 
ةأرملاو يف لمحت فلتخم ايلوؤسملات يفو 
عيمج تلااجملا. 
ىعست ةلودلا ىلإ قيقحت فصانتلا نيب ةأرملا 
لجرلاو يف سلاجملا ةبختنملا. 
ذختت ةلودلا ريبادتلا ةليفكلا ءاضقلاب ىلع 
فنعلا دض ةأرملا. 
Article (46) 
The State shall commit to 
protecting women's achieved 
rights and seek to support and 
develop them. 
The State shall guarantee equal 
opportunities between men and 
women in the bearing of all the 
various responsibilities in all 
fields. 
The State shall seek to achieve 
equal representation for women 
and men in elected councils. 
The State shall take the necessary 
measures to eliminate violence 
against women. 
( لصفلا47) 
قوقح لفطلا ىلع هيوبأ ىلعو ةلودلا نامض 
ةماركلا ةحصلاو ةياعرلاو ةيبرتلاو ميلعتلاو. 
ىلع ةلودلا ريفوت عيمج عاونأ ةيامحلا  ّلكل 
لافطلأا نود زييمت قفو حلاصملا ىلضفلا 
formed that discriminates on 
the basis of gender, origin or 
religion.  
( ةداملا8) 
لودلا لفكت لدعلا قيقحت لئاسو ة
 لبس ريسيتب مزتلتو ،ةيرحلاو ةاواسملاو
 نماضتلاو يعامتجلاا لفاكتلاو محارتلا
 ةيامح نمضتو ،عمتجملا دارفأ نيب
 لمعتو ،لاوملأاو ضارعلأاو سفنلأا
 ؛نينطاوملا عيمجل ةيافكلا دح قيقحت ىلع
.نوناقلا دودح يف هلك كلذو 
Article (8) 
The State guarantees the means 
to achieve justice, equality and 
freedom, and is committed to 
facilitating the channels of 
social charity and solidarity 
between the members of 
society, and to ensure the 
protection of persons and 
property, and to working 
toward providing for all 
citizens; all within the context 
of the law. 
( ةداملا9 ) 
 ةنينأمطلاو نملأا ريفوتب ةلودلا مزتلت
 نود ،نينطاوملا عيمجل صرفلا ؤفاكتو
زييمت. 
Article (9) 
The State shall ensure safety, 
security and equal 
opportunities for all citizens 
without discrimination. 
( ةداملا33) 
نونطاوملا ىدل نوناقلا ؛ءاوس مهو 
واستمنو يف قوقحلا تابجاولاو ،ةماعلا 
لا زييمت مهنيب يف كلذ. 
Article (33) 
All citizens are equal before 
the law. They have equal 
public rights and duties without 
discrimination. 
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لفطلل. 
Article (47)  
Children are entitled to be 
guaranteed dignity, health, care, 
and education from their parents 
and the State.  
The State shall provide all forms 
of protection to all children with 
no discrimination, according to 
the best interest of the child. 
( لصفلا48) 
يمحت ةلودلا صاخشلأا يوذ ةقاعلإا نم لك 
زييمت. 
لكل نطاوم يذ ةقاعإ لاقح يف ،عافتنلاا 
بسح ةعيبط ،هتقاعإ لكب ريبادتلا يتلا 
نمضت هل جامدنلاا لماكلا 
يف ،عمتجملا ىلعو ةلودلا ذاختا عيمج 
تاءارجلإا ةيرورضلا قيقحتل كلذ. 
Article (48 ) 
The State shall protect persons 
with disabilities against any form 
of discrimination.  
Every disabled citizen shall have 
the right to benefit, based on the 
nature of the disability, from all 
of the measures guaranteeing their 
full integration into society. The 
State must take all necessary steps 
to ensure this.  
لصفلا (1 ) 
سنوت ةلود ،ةّرح ،ّةلقتسم تاذ ،ةدايس 
ملسلإا ،اهنيد وةيبرعلا ،اهتغل ةيروهمجلاو 
اهماظن. 
لا زوجي ليدعت اذه لصفلا. 
Article (1)  
Tunisia is a free, independent and 
sovereign state. Islam is its 
religion, Arabic its language, and 
the republic its system 
 
( لصفلا2) 
سنوت ةلود ،ةيندم موقت ىلع ،ةنطاوملا 
ةدارإو ،بعشلا ةيولعو نوناقلا. 
لا زوجي ليدعت اذه لصفلا. 
(2) Article 
 is that state civil a is Tunisia
 of will the citizenship, on based
 of supremacy the and people, the
( ةداملا2) 
 ملسلإا نيد ،ةلودلا ةغللاو ةيبرعلا اهتغل 
،ةيمسرلا وئدابم ةعيرشلا ةيملسلإا 
ردصملا يسيئرلا عيرشتلل. 
Article (2) 
Islam is the religion of the state 
and Arabic its official 
language. 
Principles of Islamic Sharia are 
the principal source of 
legislation.  
( ةداملا3) 
 نييحيسملا نم نييرصملا عئارش ئدابم
ملا دوهيلاو تاعيرشتلل ىسيئرلا ردص
 مهنوئشو ،ةيصخشلا مهلاوحلأ ةمِّظنملا
.ةيحورلا مهتادايق رايتخاو ،ةينيدلا 
Article (3) 
The canon principles of 
Egyptian Christians and Jews 
are the main 
Religion and State 
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law. 
This article cannot be amended. 
 
 
source of legislation for their 
personal status laws, religious 
affairs, 
and the selection of their 
spiritual leaders.  
ةداملا (219) 
ئدابم ةعيرشلا ةيملسلإا لمشت اهتلدأ 
،ةيلكلا اهدعاوقو ةيلوصلأا ،ةيهقفلاو 
اهرداصمو ،ةربتعملا يف بهاذم لهأ 
ةنسلا ةعامجلاو. 
Article (219) 
The principles of Islamic 
Sharia include general 
evidence, foundational 
rules, rules of jurisprudence, 
and credible sources accepted 
in Sunni doctrines and by the 
larger community. 
( لصفلا49) 
ددحي نوناقلا طباوضلا ةقلعتملا قوقحلاب 
تايرحلاو ةنومضملا اذهب روتسدلا 
اهتسراممو امب لا لاني نم اهرهوج. 
لاو عضوت هذه ضلاطباو  ّلاإ ةرورضل 
اهيضتقت ةلود ةيندم ةيطارقميد فدهبو ةيامح 
قوقح ،ريغلا وأ تايضتقمل 
نملأا ،ماعلا وأ عافدلا ،ينطولا وأ ةحصلا 
،ةماعلا وأ بادلآا ،ةماعلا كلذو عم مارتحا 
بسانتلا نيب هذه 
طباوضلا اهتابجومو. لّفكتتو تائيهلا 
ةيئاضقلا ب ةيامح قوقحلا تايرحلاو نم يأ 
تناكاه. 
لا زوجي  ّيلأ ليدعت نأ لاني نم تابستكم 
قوقح ناسنلإا هتايرحو ةنومضملا يف اذه 
روتسدلا. 
Article (49) 
The law shall determine the 
limitations related to the rights 
and freedoms that are guaranteed 
by this Constitution and their 
exercise, on the condition that it 
does not compromise their 
essence. These limitations can 
only be put in place where 
necessary in a civil democratic 
state, with the aim of protecting 
the rights of others or based on 
the requirements of public order, 
national defense, public health or 
public morals. Proportionality 
between these limitations and 
( ةداملا10 ) 
 نيدلا اهماوق ،عمتجملا ساسأ ةرسلأا
.ةينطولاو قلخلأاو 
 مازتللاا ىلع عمتجملاو ةلودلا صرحتو
 ليصلأا عباطلاب ىلعو ،ةيرصملا ةرسلأل
 اهميق خيسرتو ،اهرارقتساو اهكسامت
 وحنلا ىلع كلذو ؛اهتيامحو ةيقلخلأا
.نوناقلا همظني ىذلا 
 ةلوفطلاو ةموملأا تامدخ ةلودلا لفكتو
 ةأرملا تابجاو نيب قيفوتلاو ،ناجملاب
.ماعلا اهلمعو اهترسأ وحن 
 ةأرملل ةصاخ ةيامحو ةيانع ةلودلا ىلوتو
لاو ةليعُملا.ةلمرلأاو ةقلطم 
Article 10 
The family is the basis of the 
society and is founded on 
religion, morality and 
patriotism. 
The State is keen to preserve 
the genuine character of the 
Egyptian family, its cohesion 
and stability, and to protect its 
moral values, all as regulated 
by law. 
The State shall ensure maternal 
and child health services free 
of charge, and enable the 
Other Refereed to 
articles 
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their motives must be respected. 
Judicial authorities shall ensure 
that rights and freedoms are 
protected from all violations.  
No amendment that undermines 
any human rights acquisitions or 
freedoms guaranteed in this 
Constitution is allowed. 
لصفلا (58) 
يدؤي لك وضع سلجمب باون بعشلا يف 
ةيادب هترشابم هماهمل نيميلا ةيلاتلا: 
"مسقأ للهاب ميظعلا نأ مدخأ نطولا ،صلخإب 
نأو مزتلأ ماكحأب روتسدلا ءلاولابو ماتلا 
سنوتل". 
Article 58  
Every member in the Chamber of 
the People’s Deputies shall, upon 
assuming his or her functions, 
swear the following oath: “I do 
solemnly swear by Almighty God 
that I will work to serve the 
nation with sincerity, that I will 
abide by the provisions of the 
Constitution and maintain 
complete loyalty to Tunisia”. 
( لصفلا74 )– ىلولأا ةرقفلا 
حشرتلا بصنمل سيئر ةيروهمجلا قح لكل 
ةبخان وأ بخان يسنوت ةيسنجلا ذنم ،ةدلاولا 
هنيد ملسلإا. 
Article (74)  
Running for the position of 
President of the Republic shall be 
a right for every male and female 
voter who holds Tunisian 
nationality since birth, whose 
religion is Islam.  
( لصفلا76) 
يدؤي سيئر ةيروهمجلا بختنملا مامأ سلجم 
باون بعشلا نيميلا ةيلاتلا: 
"مسقأ للهاب ميظعلا نأ ظفاحأ ىلع للقتسا 
سنوت ةملسو ،اهبارت نأو مرتحأ اهروتسد 
،اهعيرشتو نأو ىعرأ 
،اهحلاصم نأو مزتلأ ءلاولاب اهل". 
Article (76) 
The elected President of the 
Republic shall, before the 
Chamber of the People’s 
reconciliation between the 
duties of a woman toward her 
family and her work. 
The State shall provide special 
care and protection to female 
breadwinners, divorced women 
and widows. 
( ةداملا11) 
 ماظنلاو بادلآاو قلخلأا ةلودلا ىعرت
 ميقلاو ةيبرتلل عيفرلا ىوتسملاو ،ماعلا
 ،ةيملعلا قئاقحلاو ،ةينطولاو ةينيدلا
 يخيراتلا ثارتلاو ،ةيبرعلا ةفاقثلاو
 همظني امل اقفو كلذو ؛بعشلل يراضحلاو
.نوناقلا 
Article 11 
The State shall safeguard 
ethics, public morality and 
public order, and 
foster a high level of education 
and of religious and patriotic 
values, scientific thinking, 
Arab culture, and the historical 
and cultural heritage of the 
people; all as shall be regulated 
by law. 
( ةداملا12 ) 
 ةيفاقثلا تاموقملا ةلودلا ىمحت
 لمعتو ،عمتجملل ةيوغللاو ةيراضحلاو
فراعملاو مولعلاو ميلعتلا بيرعت ىلع 
Article 12 
The State shall safeguard the 
cultural and linguistic 
constituents of society, and 
foster the Arabization of 
education, science and 
knowledge. 
( ةداملا81) 
 صخشب ةقيصللا تايرحلاو قوقحلا
.هاصاقتنا لاو ليطعت لبقت لا نطاوملا 
 ةسرامم مظني نوناق ىلأ زوجي لاو
 سمي امب اهديقي نأ تايرحلاو قوقحلا
.اهرهوجو اهلصأ 
 لا امب تايرحلاو قوقحلا سراُمتو
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Deputies, swear the following 
oath: “I do solemnly swear by 
Almighty God to maintain the 
independence of Tunisia and the 
safety of its territory, to respect its 
Constitution and legislation, to 
safeguard its interests, and to 
remain loyal to it."  
( لصفلا89 )– ةسماخلا ةرقفلا 
يدؤي سيئر ةموكحلا اهؤاضعأو مامأ سيئر 
ةيروهمجلا نيميلا ةيلاتلا: 
"مسقأ للهاب ميظعلا نأ لمعأ صلخإب ريخل 
سنوت نأو مرتحأ اهروتسد اهعيرشتو نأو 
ىعرأ اهحلاصم نأو مزتلأ ءلاولاب اهل". 
Article (89) – Para. 5 
The Prime Minister and the 
members of government shall be 
sworn in before the President of 
the Republic in accordance with 
the following oath: “I swear by 
Almighty God to work sincerely 
for the benefit of Tunisia, to abide 
by its Constitution and legislation, 
and to promote its interests and 
remain loyal to it”. 
لصفلا (145) 
ةئطوت اذه روتسدلا ءزج لا أّزجتي هنم. 
Article (145) 
This Constitution’s preamble is 
deemed an integral part of the 
Constitution 
 
 باب ىف ةدراولا تاموقملا عم ضراعتي
عمتجملاو ةلودلا .روتسدلا اذهب 
Article 81 
Rights and freedoms pertaining 
to the individual citizen shall 
not be subject to disruption or 
detraction. 
No law that regulates the 
practice of the rights and 
freedoms shall include what 
would constrain their essence. 
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APPENDIX B 
ARTICLES OF ICCPR 
 
The texts of the ICCPR articles referred to in chapter 4. 
Article 18: Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.  
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.  
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.  
Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 
  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of 
public health or morals. 
  
Non-Discrimination and Equality 
 
Article 2 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.  
 
Article 26  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status 
 
Article 3 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant. 
 
Article 4  
1 . In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant 
may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.  
 
Article 23 
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality 
of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children.  
 
Article 24  
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society 
and the State.  
 
Article 25  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.  
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Article 20  
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.  
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 
